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Inherently Dangerous: The Potential
for an Internet-Specific Standard
Restricting Speech That Performs
a Teaching Function
By H. BRIAN HOLLAND*
[Draino Bomb] Take any plastic film canister and fill 3/4 of the
cannister [sic] with __ . Fill the rest with Draino and put the lid
on it. Take this mixture to a cop car and drop it in the gas tank.
Run like hell. In about ten minutes the car will explode like in the
movie.
www.raisethefist.com 1
OUR COUNTRY HAS a long and somewhat disquieting history of
confronting perceived threats to our political system with laws that
muffle voices of dissent, particularly during times of war and great
social or economic change. Until the late 1960s, the jurisprudence of
language associated with violence and crime reflected this tendency,
permitting the restriction of voices that we found dangerous, disrup-
tive, threatening, and even unpatriotic. Then, in perhaps our greatest
moment of unrest-at the height of the Civil Rights movement and
the Vietnam war-the Supreme Court embraced sweeping protec-
tions for the voices of dissent, even those who, in their advocacy, in-
voked the specter of illegal conduct and violence as a means of
achieving social change. In the decades that followed, as America's
status in the world grew apparently more dominant and secure, the
Court reaffirmed its tolerance for such expression. Our courts, and
indeed the people, subsequently embraced the marketplace of ideas
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RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, DRAINO BOMB]. Please note that the author has eliminated
a single ingredient from each set of instructions.
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that flourishes in the absence of these restraints. But now our toler-
ance runs thin.
Real or not, we perceive the convergence of several dangers-the
physical threat of terrorism, both foreign and domestic; the economic
threat of recession, corporate scandal, and globalization; and the so-
cial threat of new technology that connects, informs, exposes, and
overwhelms us. At this moment, certain First Amendment protections
are ripe for circumscription. The question, then, is whether our con-
stitutional right of free speech is relative and conditional. The popu-
list answer is yes. The legal answer is much more complicated.
To that end, this Article carries three goals. The first is to high-
light parallel signals from the three branches of government sug-
gesting that "dangerous" instructional speech will no longer be
tolerated or constitutionally protected. The legislative branch has re-
cently criminalized speech that is understood to promote criminal ac-
tivity by teaching or demonstrating its methods. 2 The executive
branch undertook the first prosecution under this recent statute and
instituted new investigative guidelines and procedures designed to aid
enforcement of these provisions.3 Finally, the judicial branch recently
signaled its willingness to consider exempting instructional speech
from full constitutional protection.
Building on this last point, the second goal of this Article is to
establish that the Supreme Court may be poised to announce a new
theory of lesser constitutional protection for "dangerous" instruc-
tional speech. Here, I suggest that the Court will likely explicitly limit
the scope of Brandenburg v. Ohio,4 distinguishing and exempting
speech that, through its capacity to perform a teaching function, cre-
ates the abstract potential for violence. In its place the Court seems
inclined to adopt a derivative of the "public danger" doctrine more
akin in application, albeit unintentionally, to a discredited analysis
used primarily to sanction political censorship of the Socialist Party in
the 1920s and of the Communist Party in the 1950s. Brandenburg's im-
minence requirement is eliminated as applied to certain types of in-
structional speech under this approach. The question of public
danger, both as a matter of doctrine and proof, will become a func-
tion of the speech itself and the context of its distribution. Intent, a
question of fact, may be consumed by the scope of the public-danger
analysis.
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 8 4 2(p) (2000).
3. See infra note 94.
4. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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The third and final goal of this Article is to demonstrate that this
public-danger derivative will, in application, create a de facto Internet-
specific standard, incorporating standards of likelihood and intent
that are easily subsumed by the very nature of the network and that
will tend to affirm content-based regulation of disfavored online
speech that performs a teaching function.
The likelihood of such an outcome is both real and profoundly
troubling. The ideal of freedom that lies at the heart of open Internet
architecture is intended to secure and promote expression. Yet, the
derivative public-danger doctrine that I envision would turn this ideal
on its head. Decentralization, data neutrality, immediate and unlim-
ited access, anonymity-the very core of the Internet-would them-
selves create the pretext of danger, and thus the foundation for
curtailing expression. An analytical framework that one might find ac-
ceptable in the offline world would create near self-validating restric-
tions on instructional speech when applied online.
I. Parallel Signals of Pending Change
Within the past few years, the legislative and executive branches
of government have embraced the idea that particular types of instruc-
tional speech create a public danger that must be curtailed before
that danger is realized and, indeed, before action is imminent. They
are now pushing the judiciary to condone the constitutionality of leg-
islation criminalizing certain instructional speech and its enforce-
ment. The lower courts have struggled with this question for some
time, crafting constitutional principles around existing authority of
questionable application. Now, it seems, at least one Supreme Court
Justice is eager to address the question. In this climate, it appears un-
likely that the Court will avoid the issue of instructional speech for
much longer.
A. Congress Criminalizes the Distribution of Bomb-Making
Instructions
In 1999, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 842(p) criminalizing the
mere distribution of bomb-making instructions and similar materials,
with no requirement that such instruction be used in a completed or
attempted act of violence. 5 This legislation was enacted not only with a
full appreciation of its challenge to the existing constitutional frame-
work, but with the express intent of narrowing the speech protections
5. 18 U.S.C. § 842(p).
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recognized in Brandenburg v. Ohio.6 To fully understand the constitu-
tional import of this statute, it is necessary to explore its rather convo-
luted legislative background. It took over four years, a full
constitutional review, and the tragedies in Oklahoma City and Colum-
bine to bring section 842(p) into law. The statute is thus inseparable
from the seminal events, public perceptions, and politics that drove its
enactment.
On April 19, 1995 at 9:02 A.M., a homemade fertilizer and fuel oil
bomb weighing nearly 5,000 pounds was detonated outside the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. One hundred and
sixty-eight people died. 7 Among the possessions of convicted bomber
Timothy McVeigh, law enforcement officials discovered two books:
Homemade C-4, A Recipe for Survival and Ragnar's Big Book of Homemade
Weapons and Improvised Explosives.8 Although the seized items were in
traditional book form, 9 many have suggested that McVeigh had gath-
ered bomb-making instructions from the Internet through discussion
groups, bulletin boards, or websites.' 0 This information has, however,
never been verified.
Nevertheless, in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, the In-
ternet was widely perceived as a repository for illegal and dangerous
information-a breeding-ground for terrorism. The Department of
Justice ("DOJ") added political fuel to this public fire when, during a
Senate hearing, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General testified that in-
structions explaining how to build a bomb similar to that used in
Oklahoma City had been posted on the Internet within hours of the
6. See 143 CONG. REc. S5978-S5991 (June 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein);
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION
§ VI(B) (Apr. 7, 1997), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.
html (last accessed Dec. 19, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 1997 REPORT].
7. Lois Romano, Prosecutors Seek Death for Nichols, WASH. POST ONLINE, Dec. 30, 1997,
at http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/oklahoma/stories/ nichols
1230.htm (last accessed Jan. 15, 2004).
8. 143 CONG. REc. S5990 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). It should be noted that both
tites, as well as thirty-six other related titles by Ragnar Benson, are still available from
online bookseller Amazon.com, Inc. Barnes & Noble (bn.com) also carries both titles, as
well as thirty-two additional titles by the same author.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WATCH, DAVID TOURETZKY: TOURETZKY AND TERROR-
ISM, at http://www.religiousfreedomwatch.org/extremists/touretzky2.html (last accessed
Dec. 19, 2004) ("Timothy McVeigh used instructions like these, downloaded off the In-
ternet, to build the fertilizer bomb he used to blow up the Oklahoma Federal Building and
commit mass murder."); Opinion, It's Time for a Purge of Government Web Sites, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES ONLINE (Russia), Apr. 5, 2002, at http://www.sptimesrussia.com/archive/
times/759/opinion/o_6148.htm (last accessed Jan. 15, 2005).
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bombing, complete with diagrams and instructions on how to improve
the design.II The nearly inevitable political response came just two
months later in June 1995, when Senator Dianne Feinstein, a Demo-
crat from California, proposed an amendment to the pending Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 12 ("AEDPA"). An express
purpose of the Feinstein Amendment was, inter alia, to criminalize the
distribution of bomb-making instructions and similar material, partic-
ularly via the Internet. a3
Despite Senate approval,14 the 1995 Feinstein Amendment was
not enacted into law at that time, 15 but was replaced with a require-
ment that the DOJ conduct a study of the problem, as well as potential
solutions (the "Report").' 6 Specifically, section 709(a) of the AEDPA
required the Attorney General to prepare a congressional report on
six issues: (1) the public availability of bomb-making instructions and
related material; (2) evidence that such information has been used in
acts of domestic or international terrorism; (3) the likelihood that
such information may be used in future incidents of terrorism; (4) the
applicability of current federal law to restrict such material; (5) the
need for additional laws; and (6) a First Amendment analysis of these
issues. 17 The Report was submitted to the Senate in April 1997.18
The Report determined that bomb-making instructions have long
been available in a variety of media.' 9 Moreover, at the time of the
study, two years after the Oklahoma City bombing, instructional
guides on the manufacture of explosives remained widely available in
bookstores, public libraries, and on the Internet.20 The Report con-
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6.
12. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,. 1297 (1996).
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6. The Feinstein Amendment,
which was part of the Senate version of the AEDPA, would have amended 18 U.S.C. § 842
so as to make it "unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making of explosive
materials, or to distribute by any means information pertaining to... the manufacture of
explosive materials." Id. This prohibition was to be limited by a scienter requirement, that
.the person intends or knows, that such explosive materials or information will likely be
used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal offense or a
criminal purpose affecting interstate commerce." Id.
14. Id.
15. In April 1996, during the legislation reconciliation process, the conference com-
mittee removed the Feinstein Amendment from the AEDPA. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 709(a).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6 (header).
19. Id. § I.
20. Id. § I(A). According to the Report, "[A] cursory search of the holdings of the
Library of Congress located at least 50 publications substantially devoted to such informa-
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cluded that most of the information readily available in print is also
available over the Internet.21 Like many claims regarding the availabil-
ity of bomb-making instructions on the Internet, however, the Re-
port's best evidence was anecdotal. 22 For instance, the Report relied
tion, all readily available to any member of the public." Id. Sample publications cited in the
DOJ Report include:
Guerrilla 's Arsenal: Advanced Techniques For Making Explosives and Time-delay Bombs
(Paladin Press, 1994); The Anarchist Arsenal (Harber, 1992); Deadly Brew: Advanced
Improvised Explosives (Paladin Press, 1987); The Anarchist's Handbook (J. Flores,
1995); Improvised Explosives: How To Make Your Own (Paladin Press, 1985); and
Ragnar's Guide to Home and Recreational Use of High Explosives (Paladin Press, 1988).
Id. In a telling footnote, the DOJ stated:
The DOJ Committee considered carefully the question whether the inclusion in
this Report of titles of, and illustrative excerpts from, bombmaking texts would
enhance the availability of such information to persons bent upon fabricating
bombs and other destructive devices. The Committee concluded that such infor-
mation already is so readily available to such individuals that its publication in a
Report to Congress will create no additional risk.
Id. at n.2.
Many mainstream publications were also cited. For instance, the August 1993 edition
of Reader's Digest included fairly detailed information regarding the construction of the
pipe bombs used in the murder of a federal judge. Id. § I(A). The perpetrator of an unre-
lated bombing admitted that he used the Reader's Digest descriptions to construct his explo-
sives. Id. (citing Hunt for a Mad Bomber, READER'S DiC., Aug. 1993, at 77, 79). The Report
also noted that substantially the same information is available in texts "intended for mili-
tary training, agricultural and engineering use." Id. Sample publications cited in the DOJ
Report include Explosives In Roadworks: User's Guide (Assoc. of Australian State Road Auths.,
1982); Explosives and Blasting Procedures Manual (U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1982); Military Chem-
ical and Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties (Telford Press, 1987); and
Clearing Land Of Rocks for Agricultural and Other Purposes (Inst. of Makers of Explosives,
1918). In addition to these mainstream publications, the Report noted that bomb-making
instructions were widely available in "underground publications" available from alternative
booksellers and at local gun shows. Id. The DOJ Report also notes that there are "a number
of readily available books, pamphlets, and other printed materials that purport to provide
information relating to the manufacture, design and fabrication of nuclear devices." Id.
(citingJ. McPHEE, THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY (1974); C. HANSEN, U.S. NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS: THE SECRET HISTORY (1966); C. HANSEN, THE SWORDS OF ARMAGEDDON (1986)).
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § I(B).
22. For instance, the Deputy Director of the Intelligence Division of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") testified before Congress that the ATF
"recently ran a simple Internet query of 'pipe bomb,' using several commonly used search
engines... produc[ing] nearly 3 million 'hits' of web-sites containing information on pipe
bombs." See Special Agent Mark James, ATF Deputy Director of Intelligence Division,
Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate,
at 1 (May 20, 1999), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/0520jam.pdf (last accessed
Oct. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Statement of Special Agent Mark James]. This number seems
flawed, however, as running the same search today reveals that nearly all the "hits" are news
stories or similar websites. See, e.g., David Armstrong, Bomb Recipes Flourish Online Despite New
Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2001, reprinted at http://www.loper.org/cgi-bin/showgeorges-
month.cgi/-george/trends/2001/Jan (last accessed Oct. 27, 2004) (discussing the cases of
teenagers in Michigan, New Mexico, and California; calling 18 U.S.C. § 8 4 2 (p) a "dud";
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on "a single website on the World Wide Web [containing] the titles to
over 110 different bombmaking texts," all easily accessible by hyper-
link, 23  as well as similar information available from USENET
newsgroups. 2 4
In an apparent attempt to add statistical credibility to its anecdo-
tal evidence, the Report also cites general statistics from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") indicating that
"between 1985 and June 1996, the investigations of at least 30 bomb-
ings and four attempted bombings resulted in the recovery of
bombmaking literature that the suspects had obtained from the In-
ternet."25 Similar, although not identical, statistics were cited by the
Deputy Director of the Intelligence Division of the ATF in testimony
before Congress in 1999. The Deputy Director testified that "bombing
incidents... known to have occurred as a result of bomb-making in-
structions obtained from computer bulletin boards" had jumped from
thirty-five in an eleven-year period (1985-1995) to twenty in 1996
alone, an increase of approximately six hundred percent.26 However,
the Report acknowledged that there was no empirical data correlating
the increase in bombing incidents to the availability of bomb-making
and noting that "[flederal prosecutors have yet to record a single prosecution under the
statute"); William Kleinknecht, Web's Readily Accessible Bomb Recipes Worry Authorities, NEW-
HOUSE NEws SERVICE, Mar. 5, 2001, at http://www.newhouse.com/archive/storylc03501.
html (last accessed Nov. 18, 2004) (suggesting that a Livingston, New Jersey teenager
found bomb-making instructions on the Internet). Many are from England, Ireland, the
former Soviet Union, and the Middle East. See, e.g., Cameron Simpson, Ricin Recipes Availa-
ble on the Internet; Castar Plant Poison Could Be Made Using Kitchen Utensils, THE HERALD (Glas-
gow, Scotland), Jan. 9, 2003, at 4 (discussing the availability of ricin instructions on the
Internet in the wake of the arrest of several allegedly terrorists in possession of the toxin).
23. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § I(B). Available titles in-
cluded "'Calcium Carbide Bomb,' 'Jug Bomb,' 'How To Make a C02 Bomb,' 'Cherry
Bomb,' 'Mail Grenade,' and 'Chemical Fire Bottle.'" Id. Another title, captioned "Nifty
Things That Go Boom," appears to be a computer adaptation of The Terrorist's Handbook
(purportedly edited at Michigan State University). The publication contains chapters that
describe and address the procurement (legal and otherwise) of necessary explosives, chem-
icals, and other ingredients; the preparation of chemicals, techniques for transforming
such substances into bombs and explosives; and the manufacture of fuses and other igni-
tion systems. Id. Another of the accessed texts purports to consist of the "Bomb Excerpts"
from Anarchy Cookbook. This text explains in minute detail how to construct dozens of dif-
ferent types of bombs and explosive devices, including fertilizer bombs, dynamite, and
other explosives made with chemicals and other substances that "can be bought at Kmart,
and various hardware supply shops." Id. It also provides suggested uses for the explosives,
including the destruction of mailboxes, cars, picture windows, and phone booths. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Statement of Special Agent Mark James, supra note 22, at 1 (emphasis added).
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information generally, much less to its availability over the Internet. 27
Likewise, the Report found that it would be "impossible to prognosti-
cate" whether bomb-making information, whether in print or availa-
ble over the Internet, will continue to be used to facilitate acts of
terrorism.28 In fact, recent statistics indicate that "explosive incidents"
have dropped dramatically in the past four years.29
Having thus confirmed the danger perceived by Senator Fein-
stein and others, the Report then turned to the legal issues surround-
ing the Feinstein Amendment. Specifically, the Report analyzed the
applicability of current federal law, the need for additional legislation,
and issues of constitutional infirmity.
According to the Report, then-existing federal criminal law pro-
vided several theories of culpability for the dissemination of bomb-
making information. However, the Report also identified three situa-
tions in which federal law failed to provide a ground for prosecution,
two of which are most pertinent here.30 First, federal law did not en-
compass circumstances in which the disseminator of bomb-making in-
structions intends to assist others in the commission of a federal
crime, but does not conspire with or solicit a particular person, and
no crime is actually committed.3 1 Second, federal law did not gener-
ally apply where the disseminator of bomb-making instructions lacks
the specific purpose of assisting another in the commission of a fed-
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § Ill. Unlike the Deputy
Director of the ATF, the DOJ Report is more circumspect regarding the import, reliability,
and accuracy of these statistics:
It is, of course, impossible to prognosticate with any measure of certainty the ex-
tent to which persons wishing to engage in acts of terrorism and other criminal
activity will rely upon printed and computer-based information instructing them
how to manufacture bombs, other dangerous weapons, and weapons of mass de-
struction .... [Wie have no empirical data on what percentage, if any, of the
recent increase in the number of bombings is attributable to the increased availa-
bility of bombmaking information.
Id.
28. Id.
29. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, ARSON AND EXPLO-
sIVEs NATIONAL REPOSITORY-STATISTICs, at http://www.atf.gov/aexis2/statistics.htm (last ac-
cessed Nov. 21, 2004) (providing statistics for the years 2000-2003). It should be noted that
this decline preceded the first prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 842(p). See infra Part I.B1.
30. The third situation identified by the DOJ Report in which then-existing federal
law failed to provide a ground for prosecution was described as follows: "[F] ederal law does
not presently reach the person who disseminates bombmaking information intending that
it be used to aid the commission of a state or local criminal offense, notwithstanding the
utilization of [or effect upon] interstate or foreign commerce." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § V(I).
31. Id.
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eral crime, but does possess the knowledge that a particular person
intends to use the information to do S0.32 The question, then, was
whether and to what extent Congress might act to fill these gaps
through additional legislation.
In seeking to identify constitutional limitations on Congress's
power to criminalize the dissemination of bomb-making information,
the Report was strongly influenced by the constitutional issues ex-
plored in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,3 3 a then-recent decision by
the Federal District Court for the District of Maryland. 34 Paladin, the
publisher and distributor of "how-to" manuals for aspiring assassins, 35
was the subject of a civil wrongful death action. Liability was predi-
cated on the theory that Paladin had, through the provision of in-
structional materials, aided and abetted the perpetrator of a triple-
homicide.3 6 The action was dismissed, however, on a finding that Pala-
din's how-to books were protected under the First Amendment.37 In
reaching this conclusion, the court applied the incitement standard
set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio, finding that the books constituted
permissible "advocacy" and "mere abstract teaching," and did not
"cross that line" to "incitement or a call to action.138 Although the
Report indicated the authors' belief that the Paladin district court de-
cision was incorrectly decided, the Report nevertheless acknowledged
that the decision made it "necessary to consider carefully the First
Amendment questions that a statute like the Feinstein Amendment
would raise."3 9
In attempting to insulate the Feinstein Amendment from such
constitutional infirmity, the Report seized on two perceived points of
departure from the Brandenburg standard. First, the Report observed
that "where the publication or expression of information is 'brigaded
with action,' in the form of.. . 'speech acts,"' and those "speech acts"
32. Id. § V(2) (stating that federal law "generally would not prohibit or punish the
dissemination of bombmaking information in the case where the disseminator does not
have the specific purpose of facilitating a crime but nevertheless knows that a particular
recipient thereof intends to use it for unlawful ends").
33. 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996).
34. At the time of the DOJ Report, the district court's opinion in Rice v. Paladin was
on appeal to the Fourth Circuit. As discussed infra at Part III.A, the district court decision
was overturned by the Fourth Circuit on appeal.
35. Paladin, 940 F. Supp. at 838-40. The two books at issue were Hit Man, which de-
scribed in detail the specific methods, strategies, and techniques of professional killers,
and the aptly-titled How to Make a Disposable Silencer: Vol. 11. See id.
36. Id. at 839-40.
37. Id. at 849.
38. Id. at 847 (quotations and citations omitted).
39. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § VI.
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constitute an "integral part" of the criminal act, that expression or
conduct "may be proscribed without much, if any, concern about the
First Amendment."40 Second, the Report argued that the Brandenburg
decision itself had "dr[awn] a sharp distinction between 'the mere ab-
stract teaching.., of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence' and 'preparing a group for violent action
and steeling it to such action' "- the former being constitutionally
protected, while the latter is not.4 1 Thus, the constitutionality of pro-
scriptions on the dissemination of bomb-making instructions would
be determined, according to the Report, primarily by the statute's sci-
enter requirements. 42 As to intent, the Report concluded that, where
the publication of such information is "motivated by a desire to facili-
tate the unlawful use of explosives" and "it is foreseeable that the pub-
lication will be used for criminal purposes," the Brandenburg
imminence requirement is irrelevant. 43 As to knowledge, constitu-
tional concerns would be satisfied where the disseminator knew not of
some future event, but rather some particular person's present
intent.4 4
Incorporating these conclusions, the Report suggested alternate
statutory language linking the specific scienter requirement to the
speaker's relationship with the recipient.45 Where the challenged dis-
40. Id. § VI(A)(3) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
41. Id. (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290, 297-98 (1961))).
42. Id. § VI.
43. Id. § VI (B) (I). The DOJ Report allows, however, that in the absence of "concerted
action between the publisher and any particular recipient of the information," it will be
difficult to prove "that the person publishing the information has done so with an imper-
missible purpose." Id. But in an artful move that seeks to elude the Brandenburg restrictions,
the DOJ Report argues that "[a]lthough, under Brandenburg, culpability cannot attach
merely because the manuals advocate unlawful action, such advocacy could constitutionally
be used as probative evidence that the disseminator of accompanying information on the
techniques of bombmaking intended by such dissemination to facilitate criminal conduct."
Id.
44. Id. § VI(B)(2). According to the DOJ Report, "[T]he government would not be
required to prove that the disseminator was 'practically certain' of the recipient's intent
[but only] that the person providing the information was aware of a 'high probability' that
the recipient had an intent to use the information to commit a crime." Id. (citations
omitted).
45. The suggested alternative language read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(a) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive de-
vice, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to distribute by any means information
pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of such an explosive,
device or weapon, intending that such teaching, demonstration or information
(Vol. 39
semination involves a particular, known recipient, the scienter re-
quirement is satisfied by either "the specific purpose of facilitating
criminal conduct, or ... knowledge that a particular recipient intends
to make improper use of the material. '4 6 Where, however, the chal-
lenged dissemination is to unknown persons, only a "conscious pur-
pose of facilitating unlawful conduct" would suffice. 47 In either case,
the knowledge and intent of the speaker must refer to the use of the
disseminated information. 4
It is clear from the Report that the element of scienter applied to
unknown recipients remained a difficult issue. It would be necessary
to strictly construe the "intent" scienter provision, requiring "actual,
conscious purpose to bring about the specified result [and] not...
'constructive intent' . . . foreseeab[ility] . . . or 'natural conse-
quence.' "49 So construed, the intent requirement would render the
statute constitutional "where the teacher intends that a particular stu-
dent- or a discrete group of students-use the information for crimi-
nal conduct."50 The same should be true even where no crime is ever
committed.51 The "more difficult question is whether criminal culpa-
bility can attach to general publication of explosives information
[with] the purpose of generally assisting unknown and unidentified
readers in the commission of crimes."52 This difficult question re-
be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal
offense or a State or local criminal offense affecting interstate commerce; or
(b) to teach or demonstrate to any particular person the making or use of an
explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to distribute
to any particular person, by any means, information pertaining to, in whole or in
part, the manufacture or use of such an explosive, device or weapon, knowing
that such particular person intends to use such teaching, demonstration or infor-
mation for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal
offense or State or local criminal offense affecting interstate commerce.
Id. § VI(C).
46. Id. §VI(C)(1).
47. Id. § VI(C) (2) ("The alternative formulation would make clear that dissemination
with [the 'conscious purpose of facilitating unlawful conduct by unknown recipients of the
information'] would be proscribed.").
48. Id.
49. Id. §VI(B)(1).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Although professing a belief that "the 'intent' prohibition would be facially
constitutional," the DOJ Report nevertheless cautioned that the constitutionality of such a
statute would, in application, remain uncertain, "depending on whether the evidence truly
demonstrates the improper intent beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. § VI(C) (2) (citations
omitted).
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mained a sticking point for both the Department of Justice and
lawmakers.
For more than two years following submission of the Report, the
Feinstein Amendment languished in the Senate. Then, on April 20,
1999 at 11:19 A.M., nearly four years to the day of the Oklahoma City
bombing, students Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold entered Columbine
High School and began shooting their classmates and teachers. 53 In
the next forty-nine minutes, fifteen people were killed, including the
two gunmen. 5 4 Guns were only part of the assault, however; home-
made explosives were also used. 55 One explosive, set off in a nearby
field, was intended as a diversion.5 6 Multiple explosives were thrown
randomly by Harris and Klebold as they walked through the school,
shooting.57 Explosives were also planted in the cafeteria. All but one,
however, failed to detonate as planned.58 Explosives were also rigged
to the gunmen's cars.5 9 According to police officials, Harris and
Klebold learned to make pipe bombs and other explosive devices
from information available on the Internet.60
Within four months of the Columbine shootings, the Feinstein
Amendment was finally enacted into law.6 1 Title 18, section 842 was
thereby amended by adding subsection (p), reading in pertinent part:
(2) Prohibition.-It shall be unlawful for any person-
(A) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a
destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to distribute
by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the
manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device, or weapon
of mass destruction, with the intent that the teaching, demonstra-
tion, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity
that constitutes a Federal crime of violence; or
(B) to teach or demonstrate to any person the making or use of an
explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or
to distribute to any person, by any means, information pertaining to,
in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, de-
structive device, or weapon of mass destruction, knowing that such
53. See generally CBS NEWS, INTERA-crivE: COLUMBINE TRAGEDY, at http://cbsnews.com/
htdocs/columbine/home.html (last accessed Feb. 26, 2004).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See David M. Spitz, Heroes or Villains? Moral Struggles vs. Ethical Dilemmas: An Exami-
nation of Dramatic Portrayals of Lawyers and the Legal Profession in Popular Culture, 24 NOVA L.
REv. 725, 731 n.32 (2000).
61. See Act of Jan. 27, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-54, 113 Stat 398 (1999).
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person intends to use the teaching, demonstration, or information
for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime
of violence.
6 2
Although this formulation is substantially similar to that sug-
gested by the Report, there is one variation of particular note. The
Report suggested that subsection (b) refer to the distribution of infor-
mation to a "particular person" and knowledge of that "particular per-
son's" intent. 63 The word "particular" was stricken in both instances in
the section as enacted.
B. The Department of Justice Expands Enforcement
The Department of Justice recently undertook the first prosecu-
tion under the Feinstein Amendment. The prosecution provides an
excellent lesson regarding how broadly this law might be applied, as
well as the practical difficulties of seeking constitutional review of the
statute. Moreover, the Department of Justice has recently adopted
new investigative guidelines intended, in part, to broaden enforce-
ment of 18 U.S.C. § 842(p). 64 These developments, suggesting that
the issue of criminalized instructional speech will soon demand re-
view, are each addressed in turn.
1. The First Prosecution Under 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)
Although enacted into law in 1999, it was nearly three years
before a single individual was prosecuted under the provisions of the
Feinstein Amendment. In 2002, Sherman Austin, a Los Angeles teen-
ager living with his mother,65 became the first person to be prose-
cuted under 18 U.S.C. § 8 4 2(p).6 6 Austin was charged under
subsection (2) (A) of the statute.6 7 The basis for this charge was infor-
mation contained on his website, raisethefist.com, a platform for Aus-
62. 18 U.S.C. § 8 4 2(p) (2000) (emphasis added).
63. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § VI(1).
64. See infra Part I.B.2; sources cited supra note 6.
65. See DAVID TOURETZKY, DAVID TOuRETZKY'S PAGE, THE DMCA AND OTHER FIRST
AMENDMENT ISSUES: WHAT THE FBI DOESN'T WANT You TO SEE AT RAISETHEFIST.COM, at
http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/raisethefist (last accessed Dec. 19, 2004).
66. A search of cited cases and Internet resources failed to uncover anyone else
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 842(p). See also Armstrong, supra note 22 (noting that
"[flederal prosecutors have yet to record a single prosecution under the statute").
67. United States v. Austin, No. 02-M-232-ALL (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2002), available at
http://cryptome.org/usa-v-sma-dkt.htm (last accessed Feb. 2, 2005). 18 U.S.C.
§ 8 4 2(p) (2) (A) prohibits the distribution of "information pertaining to ... the manufac-
ture or use of an explosive, destructive device, or weapon of mass destruction, with the
intent that [it] be used for, or in furtherance of... a Federal crime of violence." 18 U.S.C.
§ 842(p) (2) (A) (emphasis added).
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tin's political, pro-Anarchist views. Austin was not accused of
committing a specific act of violence. 68 Nor was he accused of provid-
ing information to a particular person to carry out a specific act of
violence. 6 9 Indeed, prosecutors offered no connection between the
information on Austin's website and the resulting commission of an
actual crime. 70 Instead, Austin was charged simply with distributing
the information at issue with the intent that some unidentified person
might at some time in the future use that information to commit a
violent crime. 71
Austin's website, raisethefist.com, reflects his anarchist politics
and anti-globalization views. Prior to Austin's arrest, the website in-
cluded a section entitled "Break the Bank-DC. ' 72 According to the
introductory text, this section was created to "inspire and inform par-
ticipants of the upcoming action in [Washington, DC] against the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank."73 The information
available in this section of the website included, inter alia, "police tac-
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, RECLAIM GUIDE: BREAK THE BANK-DC S30
2001, at http://forbiddenspeech.org/ReclaimGuide/reclaim.shtml (last accessed Dec. 19,
2004) [hereinafter RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, BREAK THE BANK]. Following Sherman
Austin's arrest, several archived versions of the Raise-the-Fist website were created as mirror
sites, including one website maintained by a Columbia University student. See RAISE THE
FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, RECLAIM GUIDE: WEAPONS, at http://forbiddenspeech.org/
ReclaimGuide/weapons.shtml (last accessed Dec. 19, 2004) (stating "[t]his is a mirror of
some of the files from raisethefist.com, an anarchist website which was raided and shut
down by the FBI"). As to the student's motivation for archiving the Raise-the-Fist Website,
he writes:
I feel a special duty to mirror these pages, as John Pi, the FBI investigator who
apparently led the RaiseTheFist investigation, claims to be qualified in part be-
cause he has a BSCS from Columbia-the same degree that I am studying for.
Shows that these degrees can be used for all kinds of purposes, I guess.
Id. The student also indicates that his mirror site was in danger of being censored and
removed from the Columbia University computer system:
Now, this page itself (the one you're looking at) may be under threat. Apparently,
someone filed an anonymous complaint with the Columbia webmaster about this
page. At a meeting (4 December 02) with some deans from the Student Affairs
office, I was told that the University will not force me to remove the page. Hope-
fully, there will be no further threats to this page; I'll write more here if there are.
Id.; see also TOURETZKY, supra note 65. This mirror site has also been the subject of recent
controversy. See Karen Welles, CMU Professor's Web Site Causing Controversy, L.A. INDEP. ME-
DIA CENTER, Aug. 10, 2003, at http://la.indymedia.org/news/2003/08/76604.php (last ac-
cessed Feb. 2, 2005).
73. See RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, BREAK THE BANK, supra note 72.
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tics and how to defeat them," "defensive weapons," and "basic
chemistry."
The "police tactics" section included rudimentary information on
defeating police security plans during demonstrations, creating diver-
sions, attacking and seizing buildings, avoiding identification and ar-
rest, and "unarresting" fellow protesters. 74 The "defensive weapons"
section provided a list of simple weapons "widely used and effective in
executing the goal of the demonstration," including slings, slingshots,
and boomerangs. 75 There was also a related section on the construc-
tion of shields. 76
The "basic chemistry" section was the most detailed. 77 The intro-
ductory web page noted that " [h] omemade explosives work very well
in riots," and provided users with hyperlinks to specific instructions on
the construction of rudimentary bombs and incendiary devices, in-
cluding Molotov cocktails, smoke bombs, fuel-fertilizer explosives,
pipe bombs, Draino bombs, soda bottle bombs, and match head
bombs.78 For instance, the hyperlink to "Soda Bottle Bomb" con-
nected to a web page that provided the following instructions:
74. See RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, RECLAIM GUIDE: POLICE TACTICS AND How TO
DEFEAT THEM, at http://forbiddenspeech.org/ReclaimGuide/tactics.shtml (last accessed
Dec. 19, 2004) (discussing "riot cop gear and equipment," "police tactics and their defeat,"
and "barricades"). For example, one such tactic described a flanking maneuver designed
to lure police into a trap of rushing protesters. Another promoted the use of barricades
during demonstrations, stealing barricades from construction zones, and "add[ing] your
own things to [them] ... barbed wire, bricks, basically anything that is heavy," or using cars
that "can be easily set on fire." Id.
75. See RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, RECLAIM GUIDE: DEFENSIVE WEAPONS AND BA-
SIC CHEMISTRY, at http://forbiddenspeech.org/ReclaimGuide/weapons.shtml (last ac-
cessed Dec. 19, 2004) [hereinafter RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, DEFENSIVE WEAPONS]
("Many different weapons and tools can be used in street fighting. Make sure that you keep
them clean of fingerprints, DNA fibers (hair folicles [sic], etc.), especially explosives be-
cause they may not always ignite."). In regards to slingshots, the website encouraged protes-
ters to "[b]ust out Bart Simpson style and fire some tiny metal pellets at pigs." Id. As to
boomerangs, the website cautioned protesters regarding the use of "ninja stars" and similar
weapons, warning "[wlith sharp items, though, you can get a stiff attempted murder
charge, like the LAPD pushed on a comrade of ours at the DNC." Id.
76. See RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, RECLAIM GUIDE: SHIELD CONSTRUCTION, at
http://forbiddenspeech.org/ReclaimGuide/shield.shtml (last accessed Dec. 19, 2004)
(referencing http://www.devo.com/sarin/shieldbook.pdf).
77. See RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, supra note 75.
78. Id. This web page included, inter alia, the following information:
Homemade explosives work very well in riots. There is a huge history of the mili-
tary using homemade explosives in war, so if it works for them, it can work against
them. Click on the links for construction methods.
Molotov Cocktails-The most popular choice in street fighting weaponry. A very
useful and effective explosive, made purely of house hold items.
Winter 2005] INHERENTLY DANGEROUS SPEECH
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Take a 2 liter plastic soda bottle and fill about a quarter of it with
Muramic Acid (pool acid). After this you have to work fast! Drop
some __ into the bottle and put the cap on. Shake it up a bit
and throw it. It will create a gas and explode. The fumes are very
hazardous, so make sure you won't harm anyone unless you intend
to. 79
Smoke Bombs-These easily attainable or homemade items are great when dealing
with illegal situations. It can shield any media or police cameras from catching
anyone on film participating in an illegal act. It can also disorient the police when
they are advancing on the crowd. For construction methods, click on the link.
Fuel-Fertilizer Explosives-These will create an overwhelmingly large explosion
and should be practiced in large faraway places like the desert before using. Make
sure that you will not injure anyone that you do not intend to injure.
Pipe Bombs-Not really the best explosive to use in a street fight but it still works.
Causes lots of good damage.
Draino Bomb-A small bomb that is very risky to use. To be used on cars only. Be
careful!
Soda Bottle Bomb-A somewhat biowarfare bomb made from aluminum foil and
pool acid. The fumes should not be inhaled by anyone you do not want to inhale
them.
Match Head Bomb-A small bomb of match heads. Not too fabulous.
Id.
79. RAISE THE FIST MIRoR WEBSITE, RECLAIM GUIDE: SODA BOTrLE BOMB, at http://
forbiddenspeech.org/ReclaimGuide/bottle.shtml (last accessed Dec. 19, 2004). The web-
site also included, inter alia, these instructions for creating a pipe bomb:
[Pipe Bombs] You want a standard steel pipe (two inches in diameter is a good
size) that is threaded on both ends so you can cap it. The length you use depends
on how big an explosion is desired. Sizes between 3-10 inches in length have
been successfully employed. Make sure both caps screw on tightly before you in-
sert the . The basic idea to remember is that a bomb is simply a hot fire
burning very rapidly in a tightly confined space. The rapidly expanding gases
burst against the walls of the bomb. If they are trapped in a tightly sealed iron
pipe, when they finally break out, they do so with incredible force. If the bomb
itself is placed in a somewhat enclosed area like a ventilation shaft, doorway or
alleyway, it will in turn convert this larger area into a "bomb" and increase the
over-all explosion immensely.
When you have the right pipe and both caps selected, drill a hole in the side of
the pipe (before __ is inserted) big enough to pull the fuse through. If you are
using a firecracker fuse, insert the firecracker, pull the fuse through and epoxy it
into place securely. If you are using long fusing either with a detonator (difficult
to come by) timing device or a simple cancerette fuse, drill two holes and run two
lines of fuse into the pipe. When you have the fuse rigged to the pipe, you are
ready to add the . Cap one end snugly, making sure you haven't trapped any
__ in the threads. Wipe the device with rubbing alcohol and you're ready to
blast off.
A good innovation is to grind down one half of the pipe before you insert the
- This makes the walls of one end thinner than the walls of the other end.
When you place the bomb, the explosion, following the line of least resistance,
will head in that direction. You can do this with ordinary grinding tools available
in any hardware or machine shop. Be sure not to have the _ around when
you are grinding the pipe, since sparks are produced.
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On January 24, 2002, approximately twenty-five heavily armed
federal agents raided Sherman Austin's home. 0 According to an affi-
davit accompanying the federal search warrant, Austin was suspected
of violating federal laws prohibiting "computer intrusions, website de-
facement and illegal distribution of information relating to explosives,
destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction."8 1 Austin was
not arrested, but federal agents seized all of his computer equipment
and political literature.82
Several days later, on February 2, Austin participated in a protest
of the World Economic Forum in New York.83 He was arrested by the
New York City Police Department ("NYPD") and charged with loiter-
ing.84 After approximately thirty hours in detention, the charges were
dropped and Austin was released. 85 Just minutes after his release by
the NYPD, however, Austin was rearrested by agents from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and placed in federal custody. 86 He
was charged, inter alia, with the distribution of information that
teaches or demonstrates the making or use of an explosive, destructive
device, or weapon of mass destruction under 18 U.S.C. § 8 42(p) and
possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C.
RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, RECLAIM GUIDE: PIPE BOMBS, at http://forbidden-
speech.org/ReclaimGuide/pipe.shtml (last accessed Dec. 19, 2004). Austin also provided
instructions on how to construct fuel fertilizer explosives, match head bombs, Molotov
cocktails, smoke bombs, and Draino bombs. See RAISE THE FIST MIRROR WEBSITE, DEFENSrvE
WEAPONS, supra note 75.
80. See Brian McWilliams, FBI Raid Silences Teen Anarchist's Site, NEWSBFrES, Jan. 31,
2002, at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/raisethefist/msgs/newsbytes-2002-01-31.txt (last
accessed Oct. 30, 2004); RmSETHEFIsT.COM, UNDER SEIGE, at http://www.raisethefist.com/
news.cgi?artical=underseige (last accessed Oct. 30, 2004). With the exception of a single
article in the New York Post, see Brad Hunter and Larry Celona, Baby "Bomb" Bust-Teen
Econ-Protester Held for Explosives Web Site, N.Y. POST, Feb. 5, 2002, at 19, the arrest and prose-
cution of Sherman Austin has been largely ignored by the mainstream press. What infor-
mation can be found is available primarily from independent media, anarchist websites,
discussion groups, bulletin boards, and mirror sites created by anarchists and free-speech
advocates. These accounts are remarkably consistent. The description provided here is
cobbled together from these various sources, as well as court records.
81. CRYPTOME, FBI SEARCH WARRAr: WRITrEN AFFIDAVIT: SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION,
at http://cryptome.org/usa-v-rff-swa.htm (last accessed Dec. 19, 2004); see also McWilliams,
supra note 80.
82. See RAISETHEFIsT.coM, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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§ 5861 (d).87 Austin spent a total of thirteen days in federal prison, but
was then released with all the charges dropped pending further
investigation.88
A few months later, in August 2002, Austin was re-indicted under
these same charges.8 9 At first, Austin rejected the prosecutor's plea
offer of one month in jail, five months in a half-way house, and three
years of supervised release, but not long thereafter he accepted the
offer.90 On September 30, 2002, Austin appeared in court for a plea
elocution; however, the judge rejected the plea agreement, branding
Austin a "terrorist" who should serve more than twelve months in
prison. 9 1 In August 2003, after nearly a year of negotiation and with a
sentencing recommendation from the FBI and Justice Department of
87. Jeremy Parkin & Chantel G., FBI Raid Youth's Web Site Owner Jailed, Free. Confused?,
CHANGE LINKS, Jan. 23, 2002, at http://www.change-links.org/austin.htm (last accessed
Oct. 30, 2004).
88. See id.
89. See Merlin Chowkwanyun, A Strange and Tragic Legal Journey: The Case of Sherman
Austin, COUNTERPUNCH, Oct. 11-13, 2003, at http://www.counterpunch.org/merlinl011
2003.html (last accessed Dec. 14, 2004). One year after the raid on Sherman Austin's
home, the RaisetheFist.com website looked very different. All information regarding police
tactics, weapons, and basic chemistry had apparently been removed. Instead, it included a
new section on "self-defense," including "armed training," "unarmed training," "shield
training," and "guerilla warfare." See RAISETHEFIST.COM, SELF-DEFENSE FOR THE REVOLUTION-
ARY COMMUNITY, at http://www.raisethefist.com/news.cgi?artical=selfdefense (last accessed
Oct. 30, 2004). The "armed training" section focuses on firearms, offering links to training
videos available from a third-party bookseller, but no specific information. See id. (giving
web link to an "Armed Training" page that includes multiple links to www.booktrail.com/
VideoShooting). The "guerilla warfare" section extols the virtues of the urban guerilla,
calling him: "A political revolutionary and ardent patriot . . . a fighter for his country's
liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom." See id. (giving web link to "Guerilla
Warfare"). This section also provides general tactical information via a reprint of a 1969
pamphlet by Carlos Marighella entitled The Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla. See id. (giv-
ing web link to "Urban Guerilla"). Neither the website, nor the urban guerilla pamphlet,
however, includes instructions on explosives, bomb-making, or related activities. Moreover,
the website includes a disclaimer that "[t]he information contained within . . .
raisethefist.com is for educational purposes only and is NOT intended to encourage any-
one to do anything illegal." Id. The web site also disclaims that the "website and the do-
main names [sic] raisetlefist.com provide all information for education and research
purposes only." Id.
90. See DAVID TOURETZKY, DAVID TOURETZKY'S PAGE: FEDS TO INDICT RAISETHEFIST.COM
WEBMASTER, at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/raisethefist/msgs/2002-O-27.txt (last ac-
cessed Oct. 30, 2004); Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Senator Feinstein Urges
Department of Justice to Aggressively Enforce Bombmaking Statute: First Person Prose-
cuted Under Law Is Scheduled to be Taken Into Custody Tomorrow (Sept. 3, 2003), at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/03Releases/r-bombmaking3.htm (last accessed Oct. 31, 2004)
[hereinafter Feinstein Press Release] (stating that "[t]he first plea agreement gave Mr.
Austin one month in prison followed by five months in a halfway house").
91. See DAVID TOURETZKY, DAVID TOURETzKY'S PAGE: TEXT OF DISCUSSION WITH SHER-
MAN AUSTIN, at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/raisethefist/msgs/2002-10-Ol.txt (last ac-
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four months in prison, four months in a half-way house, and three
years probation, Austin returned to court for sentencing.92 The judge
again rejected the prosecutors' recommendations and sentenced Aus-
tin to one year in federal prison, plus three years probation. 93
On September 3, 2003, the eve of Austin's incarceration, Senator
Feinstein issued a press release praising his conviction 94 and urged
more aggressive enforcement of section 8 4 2(p).95 In an open letter to
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Senator Feinstein expressed concern
that federal prosecutors were not taking the law "seriously," citing the
cessed Oct. 30, 2004). According to Austin, the plea agreement was rejected over the
protests of prosecutors. Id.
92. See Sherman Austin Sentenced To One Year In Federal Prison, L.A. INDEP. MEDIA
CENTER, Aug. 5, 2003, at http://la.indymedia.org/news/2003/08/75677.php (last accessed
Oct. 30, 2004); Feinstein Press Release, supra note 90 (stating that "the second [plea]
agreement gave [Austin] four months custody and four months in a halfway house").
When asked why he agreed to a plea bargain rather going to trial, Austin replied:
I wasn't going to risk 20 years in prison. At first, I wanted to go to trial. But when I
found out the terrorism enhancement . . . applied to my case, I changed my
mind. If I knew it was going to be a year in jail, I probably would have taken it to
trial.
Declan McCullagh, A Webmaster's 25th Hour, C/NET NEws, Aug. 13, 2003, at http://
news.com.com/2008-1082-5062481.html (last accessed Oct. 30, 2004).
93. See L.A. INDEP. MEDIA CENTER, supra note 92. A news media outlet reported as
follows:
Sherman Austin, webmaster of RaisetheFist.com, was sentenced today, August 4,
2003, to one year in federal prison, with three years of probation. Judge Wilson
shocked the courtroom when he went against the recommendation of not only
the prosecution, but the FBI and the Justice Department, who had asked that
Austin be sentenced to 4 months in prison, and 4 months in a half-way house,
with 3 years of probation.
Austin's probation stipulates, among other things, that (1) he cannot possess or
access a computer of any kind without prior approval of his probation officer, (2)
if his probation officer gives permission, the equipment is subject to monitoring
and is subject to search and seizure at any time, without notice, (3) he cannot
alter any of the software or hardware on any computer he uses, (4) he must sur-
render his phone, DSL, electric, and satellite bills, (5) he cannot associate with
any person or group that seeks to change the government in any way (be that
environmental, social justice, political, economic, etc.), and (6) he must pay over
$2,000 in fines and restitution. Austin must surrender himself to the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons by September 3, 2003.
Id.; see also Feinstein Press Release, supra note 90.
94. Feinstein Press Release, supra note 90. Senator Feinstein stated:
I was pleased to learn recently that Sherman Austin was sentenced earlier this
month in federal court in Los Angeles for violating 18 U.S.C. 842(p), a law I
authored mandating up to 20 years in prison for anyone who distributes
bombmaking information knowing or intending that the information will be used
for a violent federal crime.
Id.
95. Id. (stating "U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) has called upon the Depart-
ment of Justice to aggressively enforce" section 842(p)).
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pursuit of a single prosecution since passage of section 842(p) in
199996 and the "lenient" sentencing recommendations proffered in
the Austin case.9 7 Senator Feinstein revealed that she had met with
then Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher and FBI Director
Robert Mueller in May 2003, both of whom had assured Senator Fein-
stein that information regarding section 8 4 2(p) would be widely dis-
tributed throughout both agencies.9 8  Although the FBI had
apparently done so,99 it was unclear whether the DOJ had similarly
complied.100 Senator Feinstein therefore asked Ashcroft for his "assis-
tance in getting the word out to all appropriate components of the
Department of Justice about this statute."101
2. New Investigative Guidelines and Procedures
Evidence of the DOJ's intent to more aggressively enforce section
842(p) can be found in the USA PATRIOT Act102 and related investi-
96. See id. ("It is dismaying that there has only been one conviction under section
842(p) in the four years that the law has been on the books.").
97. Id. In her letter to U.S. Attorney John General Ashcroft, Senator Feinstein ex-
pressed dismay that "once that [single] conviction was obtained, a federal judge described
the final recommended plea bargain for the convicted individual as 'shocking' in its leni-
ency." Id. Feinstein wrote:
A few weeks ago, because of Mr. Austin's admitted violation of section 842(p),
U.S. District CourtJudge Stephen Wilson sentenced him to 12 months of custody,
a $2000 fine, three years probation, as well as other restrictions. However, I was
dismayed to learn that Judge Wilson imposed this sentence only after throwing
out two previous plea agreements reached with Mr. Austin as too lenient. The
first plea agreement gave Mr. Austin one month in prison followed by five months
in a halfway house and the second agreement gave him four months custody and
four months in a halfway house.
According to press reports, Judge Wilson stated at a hearing on the second plea
agreement that, while the Austin case had "national and international implica-
tions," the government was not taking it "seriously" and that in fact the plea
agreement was "shocking."
Id.
98. See id.
99. See id. (stating that the FBI has sent "an electronic communication to all field
offices encouraging awareness and enforcement of section 84 2(p)").
100. Id.
101. Id. In her letter to Attorney General Ashcroft, Senator Feinstein stated: "I remain
concerned by reports that federal prosecutors may not be taking this important anti-terror-
ism tool seriously. Thus, I write to request your assistance in ensuring that DOJ personnel
know about section 842(p) and are aggressively enforcing it." Id.
102. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (2001).
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gative guidelines.10 3 The PATRIOT Act effectively removes many of
the procedural and substantive limitations on government power to
surveil United States citizens in their use of the Internet. 10 4 In line
with these changes, then Attorney General John Ashcroft released
amended investigative guidelines that authorize and encourage law
enforcement to "surf[ ] the Internet as any member of the public
might do to identify, e.g., public websites, bulletin boards, and chat
rooms in which bomb making instructions [are] openly traded or dis-
seminated, and observ[e] information open to public view in such fo-
rums to detect terrorist activities and other criminal activities."10 5 The
logical thrust of Attorney General Ashcroft's statements is that law en-
forcement utilize its expanded authority to more broadly enforce 18
U.S.C. § 842(p).
C. A Signal from the Supreme Court?
With Congress pushing new laws and the executive branch ex-
panding its investigative authority, all that remained was a sign from
103. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE IN-
VESTIGATIONS (2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf (last accessed Oct.
30, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES]. These in-
vestigative guidelines establish several "overriding principles" for law enforcement and in-
vestigation. First, "the war against terrorism is the central mission and highest priority" of
federal law enforcement. Second, "terrorism prevention is the key objective." Third, "un-
necessary procedural red tape must not interfere with the effective detection, investigation,
and prevention of terrorist activities." Finally, law enforcement "must draw proactively on
all lawful sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities." Id. Related to
this fourth principle, the investigative guidelines recognized that "[c]urrent counterterror-
ism priorities and the advent of the Internet have raised a number of [new] issues" related
to investigative techniques. Id.; see also Mary W.S. Wong, Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in
the United States After September 11 2001: The USA PATRIOT Act, 4 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD.
214, 262 (2002).
104. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). The actual impact of the USA PATRIOT Act
on the power of law enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies to monitor Internet
activity has been widely debated. Compare ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., ANALYSIS OF THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE USA PATRIOT AcT THAT RELATE TO ONLINE ACTIVITIES, at http://www.eff.
org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism//20011031_eff.usa-patriot.analysis.php (last ac-
cessed Oct. 30, 2004) (criticizing the expansion of surveillance power), with Orin S. Kerr,
Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 607 (2003) (arguing that criticisms of the surveillance provisions are misplaced).
105. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES, supra note 103 ("The
FBI is authorized to carry out general topical research, including conducting online
searches and accessing online sites and forums as part of such research on the same terms
and conditions as members of the public generally."); id. ("For the purpose of detecting or
preventing terrorism or other criminal activities, the FBI is authorized to conduct online
search activity and to access online sites and forums on the same terms and conditions as
members of the public generally.").
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the judiciary that such movement would be constitutionally permitted.
In its 1997 Report, the DOJ sought to steer a careful course around
existing legal protections. Directed communications intended to
bring about a violent act by a known individual were, under the DOJ's
analysis, outside the reach of Brandenburg v. Ohio. But as applied to
general publication in the Internet environment-web pages, bulletin
boards, etc.-Brandenburg's imminence and likelihood requirements
remained troublesome, particularly because Congress failed to incor-
porate key limiting language in the statute. Then came Justice John
Paul Stevens's rather unexpected statements in Stewart v. McCoy.10 6
Jerry Dean McCoy met a few young gang members at a
barbeque. 10 7 He told them a few stories about his old gang and the
way it operated, sometimes in the form of advice, including suggesting
that the gang continue their initiation practices and increase tagging
(graffiti). 08 For this act alone, McCoy was convicted of participating
in a street gang and sentenced to fifteen years in jail. 109
In a federal petition for habeas corpus, McCoy argued that his
speech was mere abstract advocacy of lawlessness, not directed at incit-
ing imminent lawless action, and was therefore protected by the First
Amendment under Brandenburg.10 The Ninth Circuit agreed. The
court noted that "[u]nder Brandenburg timing is crucial, because
speech must incite imminent lawless action to be constitutionally pros-
cribable."' I The Supreme Court had made this explicit in Hess v. Indi-
ana, stating that "a state cannot constitutionally sanction 'advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time.' ,12 Applying this stan-
dard, the Ninth Circuit found that McCoy's activities "fit more closely
the profile of mere abstract advocacy of lawlessness," and "ideas ...
not aimed at any particular person or any particular time."' 13 As such,
the speech for which he had been convicted was protected by the First
Amendment.
In October 2002, the Supreme Court denied the State's petition
for a writ of certiorari, but it apparently did so on other grounds. 114
106. 537 U.S. 993 (2002).
107. McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 2002).
108. Id. at 629-30.
109. Id. at 628-29.
110. Id. at 630.
111. Id. at 631.
112. Id. (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)).
113. Id. at 631-32.
114. See Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 993-95 (2002) (Stevens, J., respecting the de-
nial of the petition for writ of certiorari). The district court granted McCoy's petition for
writ of habeas corpus on one of four claims of error, insufficiency of the evidence. See
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Moreover, Justice Stevens issued an unusual statement "respecting"
the denial of certiorari. In that statement, Stevens first took issue with
the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that McCoy's speech was mere abstract
advocacy and did not incite imminent lawless action. 15 Accepting this
conclusion, however, Justice Stevens then called into question speech
that performs a teaching function:
[W]hether right or wrong, [this case] raises a most important issue
concerning the scope of our holding in Brandenburg, for our opin-
ion expressly encompassed nothing more than "mere advocacy."
The principle identified in our Brandenburg opinion is that "the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not per-
mit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action." While the requirement that the consequence be
"imminent" is justified with respect to mere advocacy, the same jus-
tification does not necessarily adhere to some speech that performs
a teaching function. As our cases have long identified, the First
Amendment does not prevent restrictions on speech that have
"clear support in public danger." Long range planning of criminal
enterprises-which may include oral advice, training exercises, and
McCoy v. Stewart, No. CIV 98-433-TUC-WDB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23689, at *16 (D. Ariz.
Apr. 4, 2001). Specifically, the court interpreted the statute as requiring that "the gang [to
which advice is given] have perpetrated a felony, had done so at the direct behest of the
Petitioner, and the Petitioner specifically intended that result," and found that these re-
quirements were "not proven at trial." Id. at *14. Confusion over the bases for the court's
decision seems to arise from the context of this analysis, which is immediately premised by
the following discussion:
When illegal conduct occurs in the context of a generally constitutionally pro-
tected activity, such as speech or association, then there must be "precision of
regulation." Thus, to punish illegal conduct related to association with a group
with both legal and illegal aims, there must be "clear proof that a defendant spe-
cifically intended to accomplish [the illegal conduct]." For liability to be imposed
by reason of association, the court must determine that group held unlawful goals
and the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims. Accordingly,
this Court has searched the trial transcripts to determine whether the prosecution
offered the jury sufficient evidence for it to find that Petitioner specifically in-
tended to further the [gang's] alleged goal to commit felonies.
Id. at *11. Here, the district court seems determined to find a constitutional basis for the
intent requirement, regardless of the statute's requirement of the same. Given the district
court's own recitation of the alternate habeas requirements, the court's Herculean effort
to squeeze McCoy's claim into the first of these options remains unexplained. These re-
quirements were stated as follows:
[H]abeas relief may only be granted when the state court's decision was (1) con-
trary to clearly established Federal law or involved an unreasonable application of
that law, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determi-
nation of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
Id. at *7.
115. McCoy, 537 U.S. at 994-95.
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perhaps the preparation of written materials-involves speech that
should not be glibly characterized as mere "advocacy" and certainly
may create significant public danger. Our cases have not yet con-
sidered whether, and if so to what extent, the First Amendment
protects such instructional speech. Our denial of certiorari in this
case should not be taken as an endorsement of the reasoning of
the Court of Appeals.
1 16
Justice Stevens' statement clearly places the constitutional treat-
ment of instructional speech-or speech that performs a teaching
function-at issue. And with the Legislature and Executive pushing
criminal penalties, in addition to Justice Stevens advocating for judi-
cial recognition of a lesser degree of constitutional protection, it
seems likely that the Court will soon address the issue. The remainder
of this Article envisions how this question might be resolved to reflect
Justice Stevens's view and suggests that such a formulation will, in ap-
plication, create a de facto Internet-specific standard that favors con-
tent-based regulation of disfavored online speech that performs a
teaching function.
H. Divining Justice Stevens's General Theory of Lesser
Constitutional Protection for "Dangerous
Instructional Speech"
Justice Stevens's view is best understood in two parts. First, he
seeks to explicitly limit the heightened standard of protection recog-
nized in Brandenburg v. Ohio, distinguishing and exempting speech
that, through its capacity to perform a teaching function, creates the
abstract potential for violence. Second, he appears to recall, and thus
reinvigorate, a derivative of the public-danger doctrine, a largely dis-
credited analysis used primarily to sanction political censorship of the
Socialist Party in the 1920s and of the Communist Party in the 1950s.
These issues will be addressed in turn.
A. Limiting the Scope of Brandenburg v. Ohio
Recognizing that statutes regulating speech on the basis of con-
tent are generally subject to strict scrutiny, Brandenburg holds that the
state is prohibited from proscribing "advocacy of the use of force or of
law," or "the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence." 1 7 Within this oth-
116. Id. at 994-95 (citations omitted); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945).
117. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam) (quotations and
citations omitted).
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erwise protected category, the Court recognizes an explicit exception
for speech that "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.""t 8 It also distin-
guishes the protected category-mere advocacy and abstract teach-
ing-from speech that "prepare[s] a group for violent action and
steel[s] it to such action."1 19
In the full context of its exceptions and distinctions, Brandenburg
is best understood as premised on a speech-act rationale as a manifes-
tation of causation, 120 focusing on the consequences of speech rather
than its perceived social value. The speech-act doctrine maintains that
speech that is either in its effect tantamount to legitimately proscrib-
able non-expressive conduct by the speaker1 21 or so proximate to the
acts of another as to merge with that conduct may be constitutionally
regulated pursuant to generally applicable statutes.12 2 Brandenburg
118. Id. at 447.
119. Id. at 448.
120. The speech-act doctrine seeks to capture, in part, the standard of strict scrutiny
requiring that the government employ the least restrictive means available when proscrib-
ing speech on the basis of content:
When the strict scrutiny test is being employed by a court, the insistence that the
law be 'narrowly tailored' to effectuate its purposes, often articulated in terms of
the requirement that the government use the 'least restrictive means' at its avail,
is a manifestation of the causation principle. For in requiring that government
employ the least restrictive means, courts are insisting on a close causal nexus
between the harm that the government seeks to prevent and the speech that will
allegedly generate that harm.
I RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4:21 (2004) (footnotes
omitted).
121. Cf Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). Indeed, in his Branden-
burg concurrence, justice Douglas described certain speech that is "brigaded with action,"
so as to be "inseparable." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring). In such
cases, Douglas reasoned, "a prosecution can be launched for the overt acts actually caused"
without offending the First Amendment. Id. at 456-57. Speech-acts are to be distinguished
from symbolic speech, which is non-verbal conduct intended to express a particular idea or
message. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 695 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. This speech-act concept was apparently first articulated in the early case of Giboney
v. Empire Storage &Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), which held that picket lines set up with "the
avowed immediate purpose" of compelling that distributor "to agree to stop selling ice to
nonunion peddlers," constituted "speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute," and was thus entitled to less constitutional protection.
Id. at 492, 498, 504. The substance of this holding was reaffirmed, and refined, in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court held "that when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a significantly impor-
tant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limita-
tions on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376 (emphasis added). See also Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). Ohralik upheld the state bar association's deci-
sion to discipline an attorney for in-person solicitation of a client and quoted Giboney di-
rectly, finding "it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
Winter 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
pushes the limits of the speech-act doctrine by allowing the govern-
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evi-
denced, or carried out by means of language." Id. The Ohralik Court found that the regula-
tion of in-person solicitation by an attorney, by mixing conduct with elements of speech,
was subject to a "lower[ ] level of... judicial scrutiny." Id. at 457. See also Brown v. Hardage,
456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982). There the Court stated:
Although agreements to engage in illegal conduct undoubtedly possess some ele-
ment of association, the State may ban such illegal agreements without trenching
on any right of association protected by the First Amendment. The fact that such
an agreement necessarily takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or
upon the underlying conduct, the constitutional immunities that the First
Amendment extends to speech.
Id.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated further "[t]hat 'aiding
and abetting' of an illegal act may be carried out through speech is no bar to illegality."
National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
This doctrine has recently been revived, reaffirmed, and expanded into the area of com-
puter code. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001). In
CorLey, the Second Circuit addressed the anti-trafficking provisions of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which restrict the availability and distribution of computer
code capable of circumventing encryption technology designed to protect copyrighted
works. Id. at 434 (discussing 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2004)). The application of these
provisions implicated a basic First Amendment question: Whether computer code is to be
treated as pure speech and is thus subject to the same rigorous constitutional standard.
The defendants, website owners accused of posting and linking to decryption software,
argued that "code is no different, for First Amendment purposes, than blueprints that
instruct an engineer or recipes that instruct a cook," both of which are protected a pure
speech. Id. at 451. This argument was rejected by the court, however, because "[u]nlike a
blueprint or a recipe, which cannot yield any functional result without human comprehen-
sion of its content, human decision-making, and human action, computer code can in-
stantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks and instantly render the results of those tasks
available throughout the world via the Internet." Id. The Second Circuit also found that a
hyperlink ("a cross-reference .. .appearing on one web page that, when activated by the
point-and-click of a mouse, brings onto the computer screen another web page") consists
of "both a speech and a nonspeech component." Id. at 455-56. Specifically, "[i] t conveys
information, the Internet address of the linked web page, and has the functional capacity
to bring the content of the linked web page to the user's computer screen." Id. At the heart
of this result was the court's treatment of computer code as a combination of speech and
non-speech elements; i.e., "functional and expressive elements." Id. The court recognized
that the functional capability of computer code cannot yield a result until a
human being decides to insert the disc containing the code into a computer and
causes it to perform its function (or programs a computer to cause the code to
perform its function). Nevertheless, this momentary intercession of human action
does not diminish the nonspeech component of code, nor render code entirely
speech, like a blueprint or a recipe.
Id. at 451. Accord United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1128 (N.D. Ca. 2002).
Elcom states:
In the digital age, more and more conduct occurs through the use of computers
and over the Internet. Accordingly, more and more conduct occurs through
"speech" by way of messages typed onto a keyboard or implemented through the
use of computer code when the object code commands computers to perform
certain functions. The mere fact that this conduct occurs at some level through
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ment, in certain circumstances, to prohibit speech before there is an
action with which that speech can be said to have merged. In its place,
Brandenburg accepts the potential for action. It is not surprising, then,
that the requirements for invoking this legal fiction-specific intent,
imminence, and likelihood-have been so strictly applied. 23
Thus described, Brandenburg embodies the modern formulation
of the "clear and present danger" ("CPD") standard. 124 At one time,
CPD was the standard against which nearly all content-based restric-
tions were to be judged. Over the past thirty-five years, however, its
influence has greatly diminished. Certain categories of speech-those
deemed to be of little or no social value-are now seen as outside the
full scope of First Amendment protection and thus removed from the
CPD analysis. This includes, inter alia, fighting words, 125 obscenity, 126
child pornography, 127 and fraud,t 28 and to a lesser extent commercial
speech 29 and defamation. 130 Initially, Justice Stevens's rejection of
the Brandenburg standard might thus seem an unremarkable continua-
expression does not elevate all such conduct to the highest levels of First Amend-
ment protection.
Id. These functional elements must "inform and limit the scope of [the computer code's]
First Amendment protection," implicating a lesser constitutional standard. Corley, 273 F.3d
at 442, 453. Thus, where the target of governmental regulation is the non-speech elements
of a particular conduct, rather than the speech elements of that conduct, intermediate
scrutiny is applied. See id.; Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1127-28 (adopting intermediate scru-
tiny to decryption technology and finding that "[w]hen speech and non-speech elements
are combined in a single course of conduct, a sufficiently important government interest in
regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental intrusions on First Amendment
freedoms").
123. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[I]n very narrow
circumstances, a government may proscribe content on the basis of imminent danger."
(citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)). See also SMOLLA,
supra note 120, § 2:12 (describing the Brandenburg analysis as a doctrine of heightened
scrutiny, "tailored to [a] specific topic area . . . that [is] highly protective of freedom of
speech").
124. As Rodney Smolla has observed:
The modern "clear and present danger" test is the most famous articulation of
the currently prevailing causation rule. In its current form, the test provides that
advocacy of force or criminal activity may not be penalized unless "such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action."
SMOLLA, supra note 120, § 4:22 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).
125. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
126. See id.
127. See N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
128. See Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 190-91 (1948).
129. SeeVa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
130. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
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tion of this developing free-speech jurisprudence. His approach does
not appear, however, to fall within this line of categorical exemption.
Instead, Stevens seems to evoke an analytical model, developed in the
lower courts, that draws upon the very foundations of Brandenburg to
distinguish its application.
Brandenburg's exacting requirements create an exceedingly nar-
row exception that has proven insufficient for many courts, leading
them to seek alternate avenues of avoiding its protections where the
proximity between speech and criminal act is not imminent.131 In do-
ing so, these courts have eschewed the social value approach of cate-
gorization and instead attempted, in line with Brandenburg's
underlying rationale, to leverage the speech-act doctrine as a concep-
tual basis for further exemptions. Central to this approach is the need
to link speech with an act such that they effectively merge. Such an
analysis has been employed, most analogously, by several federal cir-
cuits applying the federal criminal aiding and abetting statute 13 2 to
the publishers of instruction manuals that describe how to evade pay-
ment of taxes or manufacture illegal drugs. Because Justice Stevens's
view may be understood to embrace the basic notion of these analyses,
it is helpful to recall these models.
The Eighth Circuit has addressed the issue of tax-evasion instruc-
tions on at least two occasions. In United States v. Buttorff,13 3 the court
131. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) (providing, in pertinent part, that "[w]hoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
its commission, is punishable as a principal").
133. 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978). In Buttorff the defendants spoke at public and pri-
vate meetings in which they counseled that the federal income tax was unconstitutional. Id.
at 622. These meetings included discussion of W-4 federal income tax withholding forms
and methods of completing those forms that would greatly reduce or eliminate all with-
holding. Id. at 622-23. The only evidence of "affirmative action" by the defendants was the
delivery of a W-4 form to one of the participant's house. Id. at 623. There was no evidence
that the defendants actually assisted the participants in the filling out of these forms. Id.
However, all of the participants indicated that they filed fraudulent tax forms as a direct
result of these meetings and paid the defendants various amounts for a range of tax-related
services. Id. Addressing the defendant's First Amendment challenge, the court suggested
that the speech at issue in Buttorff fell somewhere between mere advocacy and speech that
incites imminent lawless activity, and, therefore, the speech was not protected under Bran-
denburg. Id. at 624. The court stated:
Although the speeches here do not incite the type of imminent lawless activity
referred to in criminal syndicalism cases, the defendants did go beyond mere
advocacy of tax reform. [Defendants] explained how to avoid withholding and
their speeches and explanations incited several individuals to activity that violated
federal law .... This speech is not entitled to first amendment protection.
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found that where advocacy of tax evasion was paired with the slightest
amount of assistance, resulting in a criminal act by the listener, such
speech was not protected. This conclusion was affirmed in United States
v. Moss.1 3 4 In United States v. Barnett,135 the Ninth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in regards to the sale of instructions describing the
manufacture of illegal drugs, finding that "[t]he first amendment
does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply because the
actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose."136 In each instance,
and despite the absence of searching analysis, Brandenburg's immi-
nence requirement was found not to apply.
The basic principles set forth in these criminal cases were more
recently extended to the civil context. In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises,
Inc., ' 7 the Fourth Circuit found that such speech does not enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment, 138 at least where the defendant
Id. at 624.
134. 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979). In Moss, the defendant gave speeches challenging
the constitutionality of the federal income tax and describing how to avoid federal with-
holding tax. Id. at 570. Several people heard Moss interviewed on the radio, in a recorded
speech given by Moss at a local hotel, or at a speech given at their place of business. Id.
"Motivated by [Moss's] speech, the principal defendants filed falsified W-4 forms." Id. The
court again rejected a First Amendment defense, simply citing and quoting Buttorffwithout
further analysis. Id. at 571.
135. 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
136. Id. at 842. In Barnett, a convicted drug manufacturer obtained instructions on the
manufacture of phencyclidine, or PCP, from a mail order publisher who advertised in High
Times magazine. Id. at 838. The publisher was charged with aiding and abetting and raised
a First Amendment defense. Id. at 842. The defendant's First Amendment defense was
raised, somewhat clumsily, in a challenge to the validity of a search warrant; nevertheless,
the court dealt with the issue thoroughly. The court rejected the defense under a speech-
act rationale. Id. at 842. The court noted that a similar argument had been rejected in
Buttorff a case in which "the defendants had virtually no personal contact with the persons
who filed false income tax returns [but instead] gave speeches before large groups." Id. at
842-43. Thus, the fact that Barnett conducted his business by mail, rather than in person,
was of no consequence. Brandenburg was not cited by the court.
137. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). In Rice, the court considered the constitutionality of
imposing civil liability on the publisher of two books-Hit Man, which described in detail
the specific methods, strategies, and techniques of professional killers, and the aptly-titled
How to Make a Disposable Silencer: Vol. /--used in the contract killing of three people. Id. at
239-41. Following the killer's murder conviction, the victims' survivors filed a civil wrong-
ful death action against Paladin under the theory that the publisher had aided and abetted
the killer. Rice v. Paladin, Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 839-40 (D. Md. 1996). For a
discussion of the role this case played in the formulation and ultimate passage of the Fein-
stein Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 842(p), see supra Part I.A.
138. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 245 (relying on Barnett and citing United States v. Freeman,
761 F.2d 549, 551-52 (9th Cir. 1985)). Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit chose a quote from
Freeman that suggests an imminence-like requirement for distinguishing a speech-act:
[T]he First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the intent of the actor and the objec-
tive meaning of the words used are so close in time and purpose to a substantive evil as
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has the specific purpose of assisting and encouraging commission of
such conduct 39 and the alleged assistance and encouragement takes
a form other than abstract advocacy.1 40 In reaching this conclusion,
the court followed a three step analysis: (1) Brandenburg protects only
abstract advocacy of lawlessness;1 41 (2) speech that is "tantamount to
legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct may itself be pro-
scribed;1 42 and (3) criminal aiding and abetting cases have estab-
lished that such speech-acts fall within the ambit of proscribable
nonexpressive conduct.143 The court characterized Paladin's speech
as concrete "aid and assistance," bearing "no resemblance to... 'theo-
retical advocacy.' "144 Indeed, the court found that such "detailed, fo-
cused instructional assistance" 145  was "the antithesis of speech
protected under Brandenburg."146
to become part of the ultimate crime itself. In those instances, where speech be-
comes an integral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense is foreclosed
even if the prosecution rests on words alone.
Id. (quoting Freeman, 761 F.2d at 552) (emphasis added).
139. The court found, specifically, that the First Amendment may require more than
"mere foreseeability or knowledge that the information one imparts could be misused for
an impermissible purpose." Paladin, 128 F.3d at 247. The court noted that this require-
ment might be necessary to "meet the quite legitimate, if not compelling, concern of those
who publish, broadcast, or distribute to large, undifferentiated audiences, [where] the ex-
posure to suit under lesser standards would be intolerable." Id. At the same time, however,
the court distinguished cases in which a speaker "acts with the purpose of assisting in the
commission of crime," arguing that the First Amendment would fail to insulate that
speaker "simply because he may have disseminated his message to a wide audience." Id. at
248.
140. Id. at 243.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 244-46. The court recognized, however, that the Brandenburg standard
might apply equally to civil penalties for abstract advocacy, as it does for criminal penalties.
Id. at 248-49.
144. Id. at 249. The category of speech protected under Brandenburg was alternately
described as "the advocacy of 'principles divorced from action,' the 'doctrinal justification,'
[and] 'the mere abstract teaching [of] the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence."' Id. (citations omitted).
145. Id. ("It is the teaching of the 'techniques' of violence, the 'advocacy and teaching
of concrete action,' the 'prepar[ation] ... for violent action and [the] steeling... to such
action.'" (citations omitted)).
146. Id. The district court had relied on Brandenburg as a bar to recovery. Paladin had
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the First Amendment permitted the
book's publication and barred recovery. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 838
(D. Md. 1996). In response, the plaintiffs argued that the court should adopt the First
Amendment analysis applied to criminal aiding and abetting statutes in Buttorff Moss, and
Barnett, suggesting that speech, when in the form of instructions on how to commit a crimi-
nal act, merges analytically with the act itself. See id. at 842-43. Although Paladin agreed to
two startling stipulations: (1) that it had "engaged in a marketing strategy intended to attract
and assist criminals and would-be criminals who desire information on how to commit
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This analysis implicates interwoven rationales. The first thread of
the analysis entails a somewhat mechanical consideration of the char-
acter of the speech itself, seizing primarily on the words "mere" and
"abstract" as limiting principles that exclude detailed and directed in-
structions from Brandenburg's protection of advocacy. The second
thread of the analysis builds on this categorical distinction by invoking
the speech-act doctrine. Once specific instructional speech is linked
to the commission of a particular illegal act, both in intent and effect,
the speech merges with that illegal conduct and may be constitution-
ally regulated. There is no separate requirement of intended immi-
nence or proximity between the moment of expression and the
moment of criminal action. Justice Stevens embraces this approach in
McCoy, yet pushes the reach of the analysis dramatically forward.
As an initial matter, Justice Stevens describes a broad category of
instructional speech-or "speech that performs a teaching func-
tion"-falling outside of Brandenburg's protections. a47 This includes
"oral advice, training exercises, and perhaps the preparation of writ-
ten materials."1 48 Here, Justice Stevens closely follows the rationale es-
tablished by the prior referenced decisions in analyzing the character
of the speech, suggesting that criminal advice, if "specific" enough, 14 9
is to be distinguished from "mere advocacy." 150
It is in the second thread of the analysis, however, that Justice
Stevens points to the possibility of a more wide-reaching effect. His
crimes," and (2) that it "intended and had knowledge that their publications would be used,
upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals to plan and execute the crime of murder
for hire in the manner set forth in the publications," the district court nevertheless found
both books to be protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 840 (emphasis added). In
reaching this conclusion the court applied the Brandenburg incitement standard, finding
that the books constituted permissible "advocacy" and "mere abstract teaching," and did
not "cross the line" to "incitement or a call to action." Id. at 847 (quotations and citations
omitted). Moreover, the court specifically "decline[d] Plaintiff's invitation to create a new
category of speech unprotected by the First Amendmenct-speech that arguably aids or
abets murder." Id. at 849.
147. Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002).
148. Id.
149. Justice Stevens characterizes McCoy's speech as "specific advice on how to operate
their gang." Id. at 994.
150. Although Justice Stevens admittedly equivocates on this point, clearly wishing to
avoid the issue, he does so rather unconvincingly:
[T]he Court of Appeals held that respondent's speech "was mere abstract advo-
cacy" that was not constitutionally proscribable because it did not incite "immi-
nent" lawless action. Given the specific character of respondent's advisory
comments, that holding is surely debatable. But whether right or wrong, it raises a
most important issue concerning the scope of our holding in Brandenburg ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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initial statement is only somewhat remarkable in that it merely rejects
Brandenburgs imminence requirement as applied to this category of
specific instructional speech.15 1 Unlike the courts of appeal, however,
Justice Stevens does not anchor this rejection to a speech-act rationale
premised on the merger of instructional speech with a completed ille-
gal act by a third-party. Instead he requires only that the unprotected
instructional speech constitute "long range planning of criminal en-
terprises." 15 2 This raises the question of whether Justice Stevens, hav-
ing expressly rejected an imminence requirement, also intends to
entirely unhinge the constitutionally permissible punishment of in-
structional speech from the actual commission of a particular illegal
act, as those cases that have addressed aiding and abetting have
required.
The facts of McCoy suggest precisely this result. First, the statute
itself under which McCoy was charged criminalizes the mere furnish-
ing of "advice or direction in the conduct, financing or management
of a criminal syndicate's affairs with the intent to promote or further
the criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate." 153 There is no facial
requirement that such "advice or direction" be employed by the lis-
tener to complete a criminal act. Second, as to McCoy specifically,
there was "no evidence in the record that [the gang members with
whom McCoy spoke] engaged in any crime as a result of his ad-
vice.' 54 "Indeed, there [was] no evidence that McCoy's speech played
any part at all in any crime committed by the [gang]."t55 It was on this
point that the Ninth Circuit found McCoy's speech to constitute
"mere abstract advocacy of lawlessness,"'1 6 protected by Brandenburg.
The court did, however, allow for this conclusion to fail "if the state
could prove that the speech actually caused imminent lawless ac-
tion. ' 157 ButJustice Stevens appears to reject the Ninth Circuit's view,
151. Id. at 995.
152. Id.
153. Aiuz. REV. STAT. § 13-2308(A) (3) (2004).
154. McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 631 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). The court also stated:
No witness at McCoy's trial testified that McCoy ever told him or her to go out
and commit a crime. No witness testified that he or she was incited by hearing
McCoy's words. No evidence adduced at the trial suggested that McCoy was offer-
ing anything more than his own belief or blueprint on how a successful gang
should be run.
Id. at 631.
155. Id. at 631 n.6. The court stated moreover that, "while the evidence demonstrated
that members of the [gang] were involved in crimes, nothing indicates that their criminal
activity was in any way inspired by or 'proximate' to McCoy's speech." Id.
156. Id. at 631.
157. Id. at 631 n.6.
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indicating that he sees no required link between the objectionable
speech and the actual commission of a particular illegal act, at least
where there exists some (as yet undefined) intent on the part of the
speaker to promote or further the criminal acts of another.
Here, the legal fiction is laid bare. Brandenburg required immi-
nence and likelihood as links between speech and act, allowing gov-
ernment restrictions to rest on established doctrine. The aiding-and-
abetting cases, in homage to that doctrine, bypassed these require-
ments only where the character of the speech, instructional assistance,
and later events, coupled with the utilization of those instructions in
an attempted or completed criminal act, provided the necessary
linkage. Justice Stevens may thus appear ready to do away with the
legal fiction altogether, such that in certain contexts the government
may constitutionally proscribe speech as speech, rather than as speech
merged with action.
On this point, however, Justice Stevens's analysis is not necessarily
as radical as it might first appear. The range of analyses that might be
applied to instructional speech is thus far book-ended by Brandenburg
and the aiding-and-abetting cases. The aiding-and-abetting cases are
doctrinally somewhat conservative, as they rely on specific criminal
conduct, either attempted or completed, with which to link the in-
structional speech such that speech and act merge. Brandenburg, by
implying the link between speech and act without requiring that the
act itself be completed or even attempted, pushes the limits of the
speech-act doctrine even further, but tempers that leap through the
imminence and likelihood requirements. In this respect, and perhaps
contrary to popular perception, Brandenburg is in fact more radical
than the aiding-and-abetting cases. Under either analysis, however,
the gravity of the ultimate act is not expressly considered, and once
the merger between speech and act is established, the First Amend-
ment becomes essentially non-applicable. Under Justice Stevens's ap-
proach, this effect is tempered.
On one hand, Justice Stevens might be seen as pushing the
speech-act doctrine even beyond Brandenburg by doing away with the
legal fictions of imminence and likelihood required to satisfy the
merger concept, and also potentially allowing for the regulation of
speech as speech. But an alternate interpretation is equally sound. If
we begin with the idea that the speech-act rationale must be
respected, at least formally, then in the absence of a specific action
(attempted or completed) with which to link and merge the objec-
tionable speech, the Court must find a legal fiction to bridge this gap.
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Justice Stevens' statement may be read to suggest that this function
can be served by a blending of specificity and probability, as defined
by context and intent. Once these elements are satisfied, the speech-
act link is established. This frees Justice Stevens's approach from the
burden of regulating speech as speech,1 58 and places it on to comfort-
able ground for the Court as a whole.
B. Reinvigorating a Derivative of the Public Danger Doctrine
In articulating the constitutional standard to be applied to in-
structional speech once the link between speech and act has been es-
tablished, Justice Stevens rests on a general statement of the public-
danger doctrine: The "First Amendment does not prevent restrictions
on speech" where those restrictions "have 'clear support in public
danger.' ,159 Brandenburg is widely understood as the modern formula-
tion of the public-danger doctrine. Yet, Justice Stevens expressly re-
jects Brandenburg as inapplicable. How, then, can these statements be
squared?
In place of Brandenburg, Justice Stevens cites the Supreme Court's
1945 decision in Thomas v. Collins,160 and in doing so, transports First
Amendment jurisprudence to another era.1 61 Thomas holds, and Jus-
158. It might be argued that there is precedent for this approach in the "true threat"
doctrine, first articulated in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (upholding the facial
constitutionality of a federal statute criminalizing threats to the life or body of the Presi-
dent). In Watts, the Court emphasized that "a statute such as this one, which makes crimi-
nal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First
Amendment clearly in mind." Id. at 707. "What is a threat must be distinguished from what
is constitutionally protected speech," and the government bears a heavy burden in proving
the existence of an actual, true threat. Id. at 707-08. In making this determination, a court
focuses on both the speaker's intent in making the comments and objective evidence dem-
onstrating the likelihood that the speaker will commit a specific act. See NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 927-29 (1982). In applying this rule, it has generally been
suggested that threats constitute an exception to Brandenburg because threats embody a
linking of expression and conduct, so as to lessen First Amendment protections. See United
States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding the constitutional regula-
tion of what it termed "inchoate conduct," where expression "has become 'so interlocked
with violent conduct as to constitute for all practical purposes part of the (proscribed)
action itself "). Further, that linking does not require imminence. See SMOLLA, supra note
120, § 10:22:50. That de-linking, however, is justified by the nature of the harm sought to
be prevented-"the fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders." Id. The harm
sought to be prevented by instructional speech is, by comparison, the violence itself, and
not the fear of its occurrence. Thus, the true threat doctrine does not provide support for
the speech-as-speech approach.
159. Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 993 (2002).
160. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
161. Although facially laudable, as it struck down the prior restraint of speech by a
union organizer, the Thomas case was a battle fought on ground that may now seem unfa-
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tice Stevens reasserts, that any attempt by the state to restrict an indi-
vidual's First Amendment liberties "must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and pre-
sent danger."162 Thus, "whatever occasion would restrain orderly dis-
cussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have
clear support in public danger, actual or impending."' 63 This stan-
dard is derived, according to the Thomas majority, from a watershed
series of cases from the early part of the century, in which the Su-
preme Court sanctioned political censorship of the Socialist Party-
the majority decision in Schenck v. United States,164 and Justice
Holmes's dissents in Abrams v. United States165 and Gitlow v. New
York. 166 An analysis of Justice Stevens's position thus begins with an
examination of these cases.
Schenck was the lead decision in a trio of Espionage Act cases writ-
ten by Justice Holmes in March of 1919.167 It was here that the Su-
preme Court first articulated the CPD standard for speech that
advocates illegal conduct. The Schenck defendants, both members of
the Socialist Party, were prosecuted for the attempted circulation of
an anti-conscription pamphlet calculated to cause "insubordination
... in the military and naval forces [and] to obstruct ... recruiting
miliar. The import and implication of Justice Stevens' citation to that case may be under-
stood, therefore, only by revisiting that struggle.
162. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530.
163. Id.
164. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
165. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
166. 268 U.S. 652, 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530 n.19 (di-
recting the reader to note 12). Note 12 reads as follows:
Cf Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470; Mr. Justice
Holmes dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 40 S.Ct. 17, 20, 63
L.Ed. 1173, and in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672, 45 S.Ct. 625, 632, 69
L.Ed. 1138; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192. A recent
statement is that made in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186, 87 L.Ed. 1628: "The right of a State to regulate, for
example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is con-
cerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly,
and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are suscepti-
ble of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the State may lawfully protect."
Id. at 527 n.12.
167. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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and enlistment."'168 Upholding the defendants' convictions against a
First Amendment challenge, Justice Holmes wrote: "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent."169 In making this analysis, the Court cautioned that it was to be
"a question of proximity and degree," that is, a factual analysis focused
on the circumstances in which the words are spoken and their likely
effect in those circumstances. 7 ) Thus, the issue of actual intent was
equated, and perhaps even subordinated, to the perceived character
of the speech, permitting the criminalization of advocacy that has the
"tendency" to result in some identified harm.171
Just eight months later, however, Justice Holmes was in the mi-
nority as he sought to articulate limiting principles for the "clear and
present danger" standard-limitations that would more strenuously
protect dissident speech. 172 In Abrams v. United States,173 Holmes ar-
gued that even "opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death" must be tolerated "unless they so imminently threaten immedi-
ate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the country."'1 74 Only in times of
great "emergency" and "immediate dangerousness" should such opin-
168. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48-49. The pamphlet argued in "impassioned language" that
conscription was unconstitutional, "despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong
against humanity," and urged those called for service to "Assert Your Rights." Id. at 51.
169. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). Schenck also containsJustice Holmes's famous exam-
ple of unprotected speech: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro-
tect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Id.
170. Id. (stating, for instance, the "circumstance" of "war").
171. Id. at 51-52 (discussing the "tendency of this circular" and equating the import of
"the act ... its tendency and the intent with which it is done"); Debs, 249 U.S. at 216. In
Debs, the court noted that
the jury were [sic] most carefully instructed that they could not find the defen-
dant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used had as their
natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service,
&c. [sic], and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his mind.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206 (stating that "the First Amendment
while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have been, and obviously
was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language," and giving as an
example "the counselling [sic] of a murder").
172. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). The majority in Abrams
dismissed defendants' First Amendment arguments with a single statement that these is-
sues had been decided in Schenck and Frohwerk. Id. at 619. The Abrams majority did not
reject the "clear and present danger" test out of hand, but rather its application to a partic-
ular type of statute. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
173. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
174. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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ions be removed from the marketplace of ideas, where their truth or
falsity would be revealed.175
Given this tolerant pedigree, how are we to interpret Justice Ste-
vens's reliance on Thomas and the public danger standard? Clearly,
Justice Holmes sought a heightened standard, both as to the gravity of
the harm and the imminence of the threat. But Justice Stevens ex-
pressly rejects any imminence requirement for the type of "danger-
ous" instructional speech at issue in McCoy, and Thomas itself raised no
imminence issue. 176
A possible answer may lie with Dennis v. United States,177 a decision
involving the American Communist Party that was issued just six years
175. Justice Holmes's dissent in Gitlow v. New York took much the same route. See 268
U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (upholding against a First Amendment
challenge Gitlow's conviction for advocating criminal anarchy through the publication of
radical Socialist writings that urged the use of unlawful means to overthrow the United
States government). The majority in Gitlow took a step back from the Schenck trinity, albeit
not in the direction Justice Holmes would have preferred. In upholding Gitlow's convic-
tion against a First Amendment challenge, the majority effectively cabined off the "clear
and present danger" test by limiting its application to a narrow class of cases, like Schenck,
in which a statute "merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil,
without any reference to language itself, and [the statute] is sought to [be applied] to
language used by the defendant for the purpose of bringing about the prohibited result."
Id. at 670-71. This was contrasted against the criminal anarchy statute at issue in Gitlow,
which sought to limit a certain and specific type of advocacy. Id. at 671. In such cases, the
Court held, the danger and likelihood of harm is not at issue:
[W]hen the legislative body has determined.., that utterances of a certain kind
involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question
whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and
of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration.
Id. at 670. Moreover, the majority flatly rejected an imminence requirement, arguing that
"where the legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of substantive evil
arising from utterances of a specified character," the government need not wait for "[a]
single revolutionary spark [to] kindle a fire." Id. at 669-71. Regarding the actual threat and
imminent danger presented by the defendant's writings, Justice Holmes famously replied
that "[e]very idea is an incitement ... [e]loquence may set fire to reason." Id. at 673. He
also wrote:
It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement.
Every idea is an incitement.... The only difference between the expression of an
opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for
the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason.
Id. Arguing that Gitlow's conviction should be overturned, Holmes maintained that the
"clear and present danger" standard was the proper measure of a statute that proposed to
criminalize pure speech. Id. at 672-73.
176. Thomas was a case of prior restraint, in which the speech occurred and the defen-
dant was found in contempt of court. Likewise, the fourth case upon which Thomas relies,
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941), finds the State's restrictions on speech-
again in the contempt context-to fail the "substantial danger" requirement of the "clear
and present danger" standard.
177. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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after Thomas. Dennis finally acknowledged that the majority opinions
in Gitlow and Whitney had been eclipsed by the "Holmes-Brandeis ra-
tionale."'1 78 Yet, while embracing the CPD standard, the Court man-
aged to pay little more than lip service to the Holmes-Brandeis
formulation of that test. First, as to the gravity of a potential harm, the
majority simply asserted that the "[o]verthrow of the Government by
force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
government to limit speech." 179 Thomas was distinguished on this
point as implicating insufficient state interests. 180 Second, the majority
leveraged the gravity of this perceived danger to marginalize, if not
eliminate, both the imminence requirement and the probability fac-
tor.181 As to imminence, the Court argued that the presence of such a
grave threat eviscerated the need to "wait until the putsch is about to
be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited." 182 As
to probability or likelihood, the leverage was perhaps even more di-
rect: "Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force,
even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers
or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to
prevent."183
178. Id. at 507. Justice Brandeis, who had joined Justice Holmes's dissent in Gitlow,
wrote a concurring opinion in the Court's 1927 decision, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), this time joined by Justice Holmes. Id. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the
result only). The majority applied the Gitlow standard in assessing the defendant's First
Amendment claim and upheld the conviction. Id. at 371-72. Brandeis, although concur-
ring on other grounds, attacked the Gitlow standard with a now-famous discourse on First
Amendment principles. Id. at 375-76. Chastising the Court for failing to articulate a coher-
ent standard, Brandeis argued that the "clear and present danger" doctrine must set a high
bar to government restriction of speech. Specifically, the danger must be likely, imminent,
and gravely serious: "To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced." Id. at 376. Seizing on
Holmes's dissents in Abrams and Gitlow, Brandeis placed the questions of gravity and immi-
nence front-and-center, declaring that "[o l nly an emergency can justify repression." Id. at
377. "The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property
is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to
the State." Id. at 378.
179. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509.
180. See id. at 509-10 ("[T]his Court has reversed convictions by use of [the clear and
present danger test] based on the fact that the interest which the State was attempting to
protect was itself too insubstantial to warrant restriction of speech. In this category we may
put such cases as ... Thomas v. Collins. .. ").
181. Indeed, the Court went so far as to argue that "[tlhe damage which such attempts
create both physically and politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure the validity
in terms of the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt." Id. at 509.
182. Id.
183. Id. Although the majority explicitly "reject[ed] the contention that success or
probability of success is the criterion," it nevertheless seemed obsessed with the disciplined
nature of the organization, as well as world events:
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The Dennis decision is made all the more important-and its sig-
nificance in interpreting Justice Stevens's position all the more
clear-by virtue of its role in the move towards Brandenburg. Arguably,
the holding of Dennis was refined, and perhaps revised, by the Court
in Yates v. United States.184 Although professing to avoid the constitu-
tional issue,18 5 the Court appeared to reinterpret both the statute and
the grounds for conviction in that case, so as to alter the constitutional
aspects of its holding. Specifically, the Yates decision characterized
Dennis as holding that the "indoctrination of a group in preparation
for future violent action, as well as exhortation to immediate action,
by advocacy found to be directed to 'action' . . . [and] violence ...
and employing 'language of incitement,' . . . is not constitutionally
protected when the group is of sufficient size and cohesiveness. '186
Yates argued that this conclusion rested, in large part, on the likeli-
hood of harm. Thus, such speech was not protected where a large and
coordinated group "is sufficiently oriented towards action, and other
circumstances are such as reasonably to justify apprehension that ac-
tion will occur."' 87 According to the Yates decision, each of these as-
pects were present in Dennis, if not the case at bar. This refinement of
Dennis, incorporating at least the consideration of imminence and
likelihood, was a key step towards the Court's decision in Brandenburg.
This illuminates the divide. Dennis, read in light of earlier deci-
sions, presents the public danger standard as a three-factor calculus in
which imminence, probability, and gravity of the harm are weighed to
determine the constitutionality of restrictions on the objectionable
speech. In this calculus,just one factor may be of such great weight as
to tilt the calculus dramatically in favor of restriction. Brandenburg, on
the other hand, replaces this calculus with required elements: If
speech advocates the use of force or violation of the law, thus consti-
The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly
disciplined members subject to call when the leaders . . . felt that the time had
come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, simi-
lar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with
countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned, con-
vince us that [the trial court's finding that the requisite danger existed was] justi-
fied on this score .... If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot
bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added.
Id. at 510-11.
184. 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (overruled on other grounds).
185. Id. at 319 ("'We need not, however, decide the issue before us in terms of constitu-
tional compulsion, for our first duty is to construe the statute.").
186. Id. at 321.
187. Id.
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tuting potential harm, regardless of its gravity, the government must
show both the imminence and likelihood of such action in order to
restrain that speech. 188 By expressly rejecting the imminence require-
ment and emphasizing the significance of the potential harm, Justice
Stevens clearly recalls the calculus approach that broadens the reach
of government restriction.
This interpretation ofJustice Stevens' statement in McCoy fits well
with, and finds support in, his general approach to the law of free
speech. 189 Rather than imposing a strict categorization of speech re-
strictions as content-based or content-neutral, Justice Stevens has
championed a multi-factor balancing approach, described as a "consti-
tutional calculus," that considers the content, character, and context
of the expression, as well as the nature and scope of the challenged
restriction. 19 ) These factors "all contribute to an evaluation of the ex-
tent of the restriction on expression, which in turn is used to calibrate
the quantum of proof that the government must adduce in order to
justify the restriction."191 As part of this evaluation,Justice Stevens has
indicated a willingness to vary the evidentiary requirements in certain
188. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
189. See, e.g., Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that are Both Content-
Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 809-12
(2004).
190. Id. Huhn describes Justice Stevens's approach to the content-based versus content-
neutral question as follows:
Justice Stevens' [s] characterization of the law of freedom of expression as a
"constitutional calculus" in Bartnicki is significant because it concisely and accu-
rately describes the multi-factor balancing approach that he employs in deciding
difficult freedom of expression cases.
Justice Stevens identified five factors that affect the constitutionality of a con-
tent-based law. First, the subject matter of the speech, its "content," in part deter-
mines its constitutional value and consequently the level of review to which it will
be subjected. Second, the "character" of the expression, that is, whether it is writ-
ten, spoken, or expressive conduct, also affects the level of constitutional protec-
ion to which it is entitled. The third factor influencing Justice Stevens'[s]
'constitutional calculus" is the "context" of the expression, for example whether
the speech takes place in the context of a labor relations dispute, a university
environment, a secondary school, a public forum, or a nonpublic forum. Fourth,
Justice Stevens noted that whether the restriction on speech is a prior restraint
and/or viewpoint-based affects the analysis, factors which he characterized as
bearing upon the "nature" of the restriction. Justice Stevens identified the fifth
element of the constitutional calculus to be the "scope" of the law regulating
expression; for example, whether the law is merely a limitation on the places or
times of expression.
Id. at 810-12 (footnotes omitted).
191. Id. at 813.
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cases, 192 perhaps deferring to legislative judgments as to matters of
security.
Justice Stevens' citation to Thomas, a case in which the challenged
restrictions were found to be unconstitutional, does not alter this con-
clusion. Thomas belongs to a series of cases in which the State's inter-
est-the evil sought to be prevented-was found by the Court to be
insufficient to justify the restriction of speech. 19 3 Rather than the
threat of violence or the overthrow of the government, these statutes
were only intended to protect against fraud 194 and to insure the fair
administration of justice1 95 and the like. Although professing to in-
clude a consideration of imminence as part of the CPD standard, im-
minence was neither at issue, nor a basis for the Court's decision. As a
factual matter, therefore, Justice Stevens' statement fits easily within a
strict reading of Thomas and indeed leverages its contrary implication
that the sufficiency of the State's interest, defined by the gravity of the
public harm, is the primary test of the government's ability to regulate
against that danger.
I1. A Constitutional Standard Crafted for the Internet
One need not accept the precise borders ofJustice Stevens's anal-
ysis, nor how specifically it has been described, nor believe that a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court will entirely embrace his approach, to
recognize the potential for judicial action removing instructional
speech from Brandenburg's protections and creating a more deferen-
192. See id. at 852-53. Huhn indicates that Justice Stevens has
called for substantial deference to Congress for three reasons: (1) because the
institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast
amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions, (2) because of the inherent
complexity and assessments about the likely interaction of industries undergoing
rapid economic and technological change, and (3) out of respect for [Con-
gress's] authority to exercise the legislative power.
Id. at 852 (quotations, citations, and footnotes omitted).
193. The Court in Dennis stated:
In this case we are squarely presented with the application of the "clear and pre-
sent danger" test, and must decide what that phrase imports. We first note that
many of the cases in which this Court has reversed convictions by use of this or
similar tests have been based on the fact that the interest which the State was
attempting to protect itself too insubstantial to warrant restriction of speech. In
this category we may put such cases as Schneider v. State... Cantwell v. Connecticut
... Martin v. Struthers ... West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette...
Thomas v. Collins... [and] Marsh v. Alabama.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-09 (1951).
194. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945).
195. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 259 (1941).
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tial test. The surrounding circumstances certainly support the ulti-
mate likelihood of resolution-Congress is passing laws it knows to
press the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine; the Executive has
begun enforcing those laws and is instituting new investigative guide-
lines intended to result in additional prosecutions; and the federal
courts of appeal are charting new territory in legal analysis that con-
fines the reach of Brandenburg and lifts instructional speech from full
First Amendment protections. At the same time, terrorist threats cre-
ate a climate of fear in which the perception of public danger is al-
tered as the potential consequences of certain disfavored speech seem
disproportionately grave. Moreover, there is simply a thread of com-
mon sense and a visceral response in the view that "detailed, focused
instructional assistance" bears "no resemblance to the 'theoretical ad-
vocacy,' the advocacy of 'principles divorced from action,' . . . 'the
mere abstract teaching [of] the moral propriety or even moral neces-
sity for a resort to force and violence,' or any other forms of dis-
course," protected by Brandenburg.196 The question, then, is how the
Supreme Court will resolve the issue. Might they bow, as they did in
the first half of the century, to the heat of political passion and war? In
this final section, I argue that such a result is entirely possible, even if
unintentional, and that the emergence of the Internet makes it more
SO.
A. Sketching the Borders of Instructional-Speech Analysis
Although the specific framework of instructional-speech analysis
is uncertain, 197 the touchstones of the speech-act doctrine and of the
public danger doctrine will almost undoubtedly remain. Moreover,
the essential constituents of this analysis are unlikely to change-the
link between speech and act, the nature and severity of the ultimate
act sought to be prevented, and the likelihood that such an act will
result if the offending speech is not curtailed. In its formulation, the
196. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997) (quotations and
citations omitted).
197. Initially, one of two approaches is possible. The first is to reposition Brandenburg,
not as the modern formulation of the CPD standard, but just one expression thereof. The
second is to limit the reach of the CPD standard, as the Court has done in the past, in the
form of a social-value categorization placing certain speech outside the reach of the First
Amendment. As a practical matter, it may make no difference which approach is taken.
Although exemption from Brandenburg might well be expressed in categorical social-value
terms, that effort would simply return to the issue of public danger, arguably gaining noth-
ing. At the same time, this approach might appear more palatable because it fits within the
framework of recent First Amendment jurisprudence. It also leaves Brandenburg intact, and
a more controversial expression of the public danger doctrine at rest.
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Court will certainly endeavor to preserve Brandenburg, while distin-
guishing its application. As such, the Court will need to address immi-
nence, likelihood, and intent as methodological expressions of the
public danger calculus. What follows is a broad approximation of the
potential evolution of this analysis.
I begin with the requirement of specificity-expressed as "de-
tailed, focused instructional assistance" 198-which attends several
needs. First, it serves a gate-keeping function, much like the require-
ment of "mere advocacy" in Brandenburg, circumscribing the category
of instructional speech to which this analysis applies. Second, as a doc-
trinal matter, it creates a necessary link between speech and act, as do
Brandenburg's imminence and likelihood requirements. Third, it pro-
vides a non-contextual measure, closely related to its doctrinal role, of
the likelihood that the offending act will occur. Finally, it may evi-
dence some degree of intent on the part of the speaker to facilitate
the criminal acts of another.
Considered next is the nature and severity of the ultimate act
sought to be prevented. The Brandenburg formulation places little or
no significance on the gravity of the potential harm, only broadly
referencing force, violence, and lawless action.1 99 It is suggested, how-
ever, that some minimum level of harm is required to justify a more
liberal interpretation of the speech-act doctrine and the causation
principle to which that doctrine is related.
Throughout the first half of the century, the CPD doctrine was
limited by a dichotomy between speech perceived to threaten the de-
mocracy200 and that perceived merely as a threat to lesser state inter-
ests. Indeed, Dennis seized on this distinction in an attempt to
reconcile the Holmes-Brandeis approach with its own. 20 1 Yet, Justice
Stevens, writing after the terrorist attacks of September 1 1th and per-
haps anticipating the application of his instructional-speech standard
to activities more directly related to anti-terrorism efforts, suggests a
more fluid definition of sufficient harm. According to Justice Stevens,
speech that teaches certain common criminal behavior, such as that at
issue in McCoy, "certainly may create significant public danger"'such
that it may be restricted.20 2 This lessening of the harm requirement
also has the effect of altering the implicit intent requirement. No
198. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 249.
199. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
200. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
201. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-10 (1951).
202. Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002).
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longer must the speaker intend so drastic a result as the overthrow of
the government and target his speech accordingly; rather, it is enough
merely to intend a general criminal act. For the Court as a whole, this
seems fertile ground for accepting but limiting the reach of a new
instructional speech analysis.
Finally, there is the likelihood that such an act will result if the
offending speech is not curtailed. As in Brandenburg, this inquiry
blends content and context, although content is addressed largely in
terms of specificity and the danger sought to be prevented. Assuming
no question of imminence, the focus is instead on the availability and
distribution of the speech, and the nature of surrounding language or
circumstances-e.g., encouragement, suggestion, or incitement.
Here, likelihood also plays a role in and indeed may seem to merge
with the intent requirement, as it evidences reckless disregard, fore-
seeability, or some similar measure of constructive intent.
What makes this analysis distinct from Brandenburg, apart from
that just described, is that there is no contextual tipping point, no
minimum requirement of imminence as a prerequisite of dangerous-
ness. Remember that, in Brandenburg, imminence-a contextual de-
termination-serves as a doctrinal bridge for speech-act principles
and causation, as well as evidence of dangerousness. Here, these roles
are subsumed by an overall consideration of specificity and likelihood.
Thus, abstract dangerousness is presumed for speech that specifically
instructs a sufficiently harmful act, limited only by the likelihood of
resulting action and divorced from a strict temporal connection.
Once the speech is categorized, there is no quantifiable minimum of
dangerousness, but instead an overall perception that the availability
of particular material may itself be dangerous. In certain cases, then,
the only limiting principle is the context of that speech and its rela-
tionship to the intent of the speaker.
The issue of intent, even apart from the particular evidentiary re-
quirements discussed above, remains a difficult issue. In some of the
early CPD cases, the issue of actual intent was equated, and perhaps
even subordinated, to the perceived character of the speech, permit-
ting the criminalization of advocacy that has the "tendency" to result
in some identified harm.20 3 This approach seems now firmly rejected.
In its study, the DOJ suggested a two-track approach, based on the
speaker's relationship with the recipient of instructional speech. 20 4
203. See supra note 171.
204. The suggested alternative language read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
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Where the challenged dissemination involves a particular, known re-
cipient, the scienter requirement is satisfied by either "the specific
purpose of facilitating criminal conduct, or ... knowledge that a par-
ticular recipient intends to make improper use of the material."20 5
Where, however, the challenged dissemination is to persons un-
known, it is not enough to show constructive intent or foreseeabil-
ity. 20 6 Rather, only a "conscious purpose of facilitating unlawful
conduct" would suffice. 20 7 In either case, the knowledge or intent of
the speaker must refer to the use made of the information that the
person disseminates. 20 8 As the DOJ recognized, the "more difficult
question is whether criminal culpability can attach to general publica-
tion of explosives information [with] the purpose of generally assist-
ing unknown and unidentified readers in the commission of
crimes."209 The text of 18 U.S.C. § 84 2(p) fails to fully incorporate
these DOJ suggestions, however, by omitting the requirement that the
speaker distribute bomb-making information to a particular person
with the knowledge of that particular person's intent to use that infor-
mation in a crime of violence. 210 In Paladin, the Fourth Circuit found
that the First Amendment did not apply to the instructional speech at
(a) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive
device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to distribute by any means informa-
tion pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of such an explo-
sive, device or weapon, intending that such teaching, demonstration or
information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal
criminal offense or a State or local criminal offense affecting interstate com-
merce; or
(b) to teach or demonstrate to any particular person the making or use of an
explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to distribute
to any particular person, by any means, information pertaining to, in whole or in
part, the manufacture or use of such an explosive, device or weapon, knowing
that such particular person intends to use such teaching, demonstration or infor-
mation for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal
offense or State or local criminal offense affecting interstate commerce.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § VI(C).
205. See id. (emphasis added).
206. See id.
207. Id. ("The alternative formulation would make clear that dissemination with [the
'conscious purpose of facilitating unlawful conduct by unknown recipients of the informa-
tion'] would be proscribed." (citations omitted) (alterations in original)).
208. Id.
209. Id. § VI(B). Although professing a belief that "the 'intent' prohibition would be
facially constitutional," the DOJ Report nevertheless cautioned that the constitutionality of
such a statute would, in application, remain uncertain "depending on whether the evi-
dence truly demonstrates the improper intent beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citations
omitted).
210. For a full discussion of the issue of intent, see supra Part I.A.
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issue in that case, in part because the defendant had the specific pur-
pose of assisting and encouraging commission of a crime. 21' In resolv-
ing the issue, the Court is likely to favor a strict intent requirement,
such that it balances an expansive view of causation.
B. Internet Architecture and Community: Tilting the Public-Danger
Calculus
Taken in the abstract, this result may not seem troubling. Most
would probably agree that government has an interest in preventing
bombings, tax evasion, the manufacture of illegal drugs, and murder-
for-hire. We might also agree that when these evils occur, government
has the right to punish those who intentionally assisted the perpetra-
tor with his crime, including those who provide him with detailed in-
structions on how to carry it out. That agreement may also stretch to
instances where the illegal conduct is about to occur, but the govern-
ment steps in to stop it by silencing the speaker who intends that re-
sult. Putting these potential areas of agreement to one side, let us
instead consider the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 8 4 2(p).
As previously described, section 8 42(p) (a) criminalizes the distri-
bution of bomb-making instructions with the intent that those instruc-
tions be used by someone, known or unknown, to commit a crime of
violence. 212 There is no requirement that anyone actually commit or
attempt to commit a crime utilizing those instructions. 213 Is this more
troubling? What about the conviction of Sherman Austin under this
statute? Austin posted bomb-making instructions on his website.
Those instructions were made available to anyone who chose to visit
his page, which was itself intended to reach fellow Anarchists partici-
pating in mass demonstrations. Although the evidence may support a
finding that Austin intended his instructions to be used by his target
audience to commit a crime of violence, there is no evidence that
211. The court found, specifically, that the First Amendment may require more than
"mere foreseeability or knowledge that the information one imparts could be misused for
an impermissible purpose." Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 247 (4th Cir. 1997).
The court noted that this requirement might be necessary to "meet the quite legitimate, if
not compelling, concern of those who publish, broadcast, or distribute to large, undiffer-
entiated audiences, [where] the exposure to suit under lesser standards would be intolera-
ble." Id. At the same time, however, the court distinguished cases in which a speaker "acts
with the purpose of assisting in the commission of crime," arguing that the First Amend-
ment would fail to insulate that speaker "simply because he may have disseminated his
message to a wide audience." Id. at 248.
212. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § I(A).
213. Id. In this sense, section 8 4 2(p) (a) is remarkably similar to the statute at issue in
McCoy. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § I(C).
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Austin intended them to reach a particular person or knew that any-
one in particular intended to so use the instructions. There is also no
evidence that the instructions were actually used by anyone, known or
unknown, or that their use was imminent. Is this still within the
bounds of First Amendment protections? Within the general outline
of the analysis I have just described, I believe the answer is yes.
As an initial matter, let us presume that the instructions are suffi-
ciently specific to constitute detailed and focused instructional assis-
tance, and that the gravity of the potential harm-the use of bombs to
kill or injure police, other public officials, or private citizens-is of
sufficient gravity to be regulated. 214 If the question of imminence is
removed from the analysis, we are then left with the issues of likeli-
hood and intent. It is my contention that these considerations, per-
haps acceptable to some as sufficient limitations on governmental
power in the off-line world, are in fact unworkable as applied to the
most common forms of Internet speech. I would argue that under this
analysis, speech available on the Internet that specifically instructs a
criminal act will be found, as a matter of architecture, community,
and perception, to be inherently dangerous.
First, consider the political reality of perception. Printed bomb-
making instructions have circulated nearly unabated in mainstream
bookstores for nearly thirty years, yet their publication remains largely
unregulated. For instance, in January 2003, I conducted a simple
search for The Anarchist's Handbook-considered by many to be the
"Bible" of armed anarchist resistance-on the website of the most
popular online bookseller.215 The Amazon.com website was extremely
helpful. The search produced two results: The Anarchist Handbook, Vol.
1216 and The Anarchist Handbook 3.217 Amazon then suggested that
"customers who bought this book also bought" the following five
books: Home Workshop Explosives, Second Edition;218 Poor Man's James
Bond,219 Silent Death, Second Edition; Ragnar's Action Encyclopedia of Prac-
214. Although this falls somewhat short of overthrowing the democracy, a goal legiti-
mately ascribable to Anarchists, it seems grave enough to satisfy our hypothetical. At the
very least, section 842(p)'s restriction of instructions on the making of weapons of mass
destruction would satisfy this requirement.
215. Although the author conducted this search online, most of the titles cited are also
readily available from traditional bricks-and-mortar bookstores.
216. ROBERT WELLS, ANARCHIST HANDBOOK (1985).
217. ROBERT WELLS, ANARCHIST HANDBOOK 3 (1992).
218. UNCLE FESTER, HOME WORKSHOP EXPLOSIVES (2d ed. 2002).
219. KURT SAXON, THE POOR MAN'SJAMES BOND (12th ed. 1991).
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tical Knowledge and Proven Techniques;220 and The Chemistry of Powder and
Explosives.2 21 On the same web page, a reader known as "zom-
bie-boyl134" offered his own list of suggested book titles for readers
interested in "how to anything ... for anarchy."222 That list included
books entitled: Special Forces Operational Techniques223 and Secrets of
Methamphetamine Manufacture: Including Recipes for Mda, Ecstasy & Other
Psychedelic Amphetamines.2 24 A simple search of the Amazon.com web-
site also revealed that "Uncle Fester," the author of Secrets of
Methamphetamine Manufacture225 and Home Workshop Explosives, Second
Edition,226 has also published Practical LSD Manufacture,227 Advanced
Techniques of Clandestine Psychedelic & Amphetamine Manufacture,228 Si-
lent Death,229 and Vest Busters.230
220. RAGNAR BENSON, RAGNER'S ACTION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND
PROVEN TECHNIQUES (Rev. ed. 1999).
221. TENNY L. DAVIS, THE CHEMISTRY OF POWDER AND EXPLOSIVES (1972).
222. See Amazon.com, Listmania! How to anything . . . for anarchy, at http://www.
amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/listmania/list-browse/-/278MROYXQZSIA/ref=cm_ayaav.
lmmore/104-2208537-8065548 (last accessed Feb. 9, 2005).
223. U.S. GOVERNMENT, SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES (Paladin Press
1980).
224. UNCLE FESTER, SECRETS OF METHAMPHETAMINE MANUFACTURE: INCLUDING RECIPES
FOR MDA, ECSTASY & OTHER PSYCHEDELIC AMPHETAMINES (5th ed. 1999). As of February 13,
2005, this and other how-to books from "Uncle Fester" cited infra were offered for sale at
Amazon.com and other online booksellers.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. UNCLE FESTER, PRACTICAL LSD MANUFACTURE (Rev. ed. 1997).
228. UNCLE FESTER, ADVANCED TECHNIQUES OF CLANDESTINE PSYCHEDELIC & AMPHETA-
MINE MANUFACTURE (1998).
229. UNCLE FESTER & DONALD B. PARKER, SILENT DEATH (2d ed. 1997). Amazon.corn
touts that "[t]his book details the home or clandestine manufacture of poisonous materi-
als, with an emphasis upon guerrilla war applications. Topics covered in detail include
nerve gases, ricin, botulin toxin, and much more. The Aum cult in Tokyo used this book as
their lab manual." See Amazon.com's product review at http://www.amazon.com/exec/
obidos/tg/detail/-/0970148534/qid=1 108329010/sr=l-6/ref=sr1_6/104-9670174-01855
08?v=glance&s=books. Indeed, Steve Preisler, who wrote the book under the name "Uncle
Fester," described the book in an interview with CBS news anchor Dan Rather as a "how-to
manual of chemical warfare." Forty-Eight Hours (CBS television news broadcast, Jan. 30,
2002). Reportedly, the book was found among the research materials belonging to mem-
bers of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which used sarin gas to kill twelve people in the Tokyo
subway in 1995. Id.
230. See UNCLE FESTER, VEST BUSTERS (2000). VEST BUSTERS is described as a "concise
and readable [book on] the interaction between bullets and body armor." See AMA-
ZON.COM, EDITORIAL REVIEW: VEST BUSTERS, at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/
detail/-/097014851 8/qid=1107996200/sr=8-1 /ref=sr 8 xs ap_ilxgl 14/103-7078001-170
1460?v glance&s=books&n=507846 (last accessed Feb. 9, 2005). According to Amazon's
editorial review, VEST BUSTERS presents details "of the construction and teflon coating of
projectiles suitable to defeat armor;" and "[1]ow profile methods for obtaining teflon resin
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If most of the bomb-making information currently available On
the Inturnet has been available in books and other printed materials
for decades, 231 why does the availability of these same materials via the
Internet232 result in a legal and political maelstrom? It would seem
that the emergence of a new distributive technology has altered the
perception of the danger created by the availability of this informa-
tion. It is not as simple as mere perception, however powerful as that
intuitive reaction may be. The analytic tools by which we measure the
likelihood of harm, absent the need for imminence, are, I would ar-
gue, subsumed by the nature of the distributive network. Here, I sug-
gest two points of concern: First, the near elimination of certain
structural and relational frictions233 in the online environment; and
second, the emergence of isolated virtual communities. The same is
... along with names and phone numbers of distributors." Id. The editor's advice: "Be a
victor, not a victim!" Id.
231. For more information on the availability and treatment of printed materials, see
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT, supra note 6, § I(A). See also supra note 8 (discussing
the availability on both Amazon.com and the Barnes and Noble website, bn.com, of two
instruction manuals found in the possession of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh).
The government itself has made this point. See Statement of Special Agent Mark James,
supra note 22, at 13 ("Publications that at one time were primarily marketed only through
counterculture markets and anti-Government conferences are now published in their en-
tirety on the Internet."). The DOJ Report also makes this point. Examining in detail "the
extent to which published bombmaking information has facilitated the manufacture and
use of explosives in acts of terrorism and other criminal activity," the DOJ discusses six
specific cases and numerous reported federal cases-all of which involve weapons instruc-
tions obtained from printed materials, as opposed to the Internet. See supra notes 20-28.
232. Even in the absence of reliable statistics, it is nevertheless clear that bomb-making
instructions are readily available on the Internet for users possessing a modicum of techni-
cal expertise. At various times in December 2002 and January 2003, I conducted searches
for bomb-making instructions on the Internet using popular commercial search engines
www.google.com, www.msn.com, and www.yahoo.com. Each time, I was able to easily find
bomb-making instructions, usually reprinted from a popular book on the subject.
233. The term "frictionless," when applied to the Internet, often refers to a business
model that imagines near-perfect information, low barriers to entry, and dramatically
lower transaction and distribution costs. Most famously, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates has de-
scribed the Internet as moving us toward a state of "friction-free capitalism," in which near-
perfect information, low barriers to entry, and dramatically lower transaction and distribu-
tion costs "help[ ] create Adam Smith's ideal marketplace." BILL GATES, BUSINESS @ THE
SPEED OF THOUGHT: CHAPTER OVERVIEWS (2004), at http://www.microsoft.com/billgates/
speedofthought/looking/chapter_5.asp (last accessed Nov. 1, 2004). "In 1995, in The Road
Ahead, I used the term 'friction-free capitalism' to describe how the Internet was helping
create Adam Smith's ideal marketplace in which buyers and sellers can easily find one
another without taking much time or spending much money." Id. "The Internet is driving
down transaction costs and value of distribution. The Web is moving us toward friction-free
capitalism." Id. The phrase "friction-free capitalism" has been defined by a third-party as
"[a] n extremely efficient market in which buyers and sellers can find each other easily, can
interact directly, and can perform transactions with only minimal overhead costs." THE
WORD Spy, FRiCTION-FREE CAPITALISM (1997), at http://www.wordspy.com/words/friction-
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potentially true of intent, if that standard becomes too reliant on in-
ferences drawn from the content of the speech and its availability.
The concept of "structural" friction is constructed around the ar-
chitecture of the Internet.23 4 The frictionless nature of this architec-
ture, at least in the sense meant here, 235 is manifested primarily in the
principle of network design236-simple networks, smart applica-
tions237 -that lies at the heart of the Internet as it currently exists.
The resulting network can be termed frictionless precisely because it
is so simple, with open protocols and a non-discriminatory data trans-
fer system. 238 It is borderless and decentralized, with the potential for
unlimited data capacity. As this suggests, digital data is also in a sense
frictionless, both in its own right and in its relationship to the net-
work. It is easy to create and manipulate. It is also easily copied, with
essentially no degradation in quality. Perhaps most importantly, how-
ever, it is easy to access and distribute. This relates, in part, to the
nature of the network, which is designed simply to move packets of
information without discrimination. The decentralized nature of the
network also makes it difficult to exercise external, network-based
control over the data once it is released. 239
freecapitalism.asp (last accessed Nov. 1, 2004) (using Dell Computers as an example of this
business model). This is not, however, the conception of friction to which I refer.
234. Lawrence Lessig, building on the communication-systems work of Yochai Benkler,
has described the Internet as a system in three layers. See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of
Innovation, 51 DuKE L.J. 1783, 1786, 1788-90 (2002). The bottom layer is physical. See id. at
1788-89. It is made up of "wires and computers, and wires linking computers." Id. This
physical layer is controlled by those who own the property in use (i.e., the wires and the
computers). See id. at 1789. The middle layer is "logical." Id. It consists of multiple proto-
cols, or rules that govern the exchange of information across a network, grouped together
under the heading TCP/IP. Id. The top layer is content-web pages, email, newsgroups,
downloadable files, etc.-in the form of digital data. Id. at 1789-90.
235. As issues of architecture and data are not the intended focus of the Article, this
discussion is sharply limited. For those more interested in these subjects, I would recom-
mend, in addition to the materials cited in note 234 supra, the following source: Timothy
Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. Rlv. 1163, 1189-93 (1999) (discussing
the importance of a layered network architecture and end-to-end design, as critical to any
legal analysis of the Internet).
236. Lessig, supra note 234, at 1789.
237. As Lessig describes it, "[T]he core of the Internet's design is an ideal called 'end-
to-end' (e2e) .. .[which contemplates networks designed] so that intelligence rests in the
ends, and the network itself remains simple." Id.
238. See id. ("The network [is] simple, or 'stupid,' in David Isenberg's sense, and the
consequence of stupidity, at least among computers, is the inability to discriminate [on the
basis of data content]." (footnotes omitted)).
239. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (quoting lower court finding number
86, ACLUv. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), which said that "[o]nce a provider
posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from entering any commu-
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What I term "relational" friction refers to the nature of online
interactions. This concept is, admittedly, a bit more amorphous and,
in many ways, emerges from the lack of structural friction that I have
just described. I refer generally, however, to five basic characteristics
of online interactions: interactivity, immediacy, 240  anonymity,
24 1
scope, 242 and permanency. 243 Each mode of Internet communication
nity"). Of course, the absence of external, network-based control should be distinguished
from content management tools existing within the data itself.
240. The immediacy of online interaction, although fairly self-explanatory, is amplified
by the decentralized nature of the network and the potential loss of control over data. See,
e.g., id.; see alsoJason Kay, Sexuality, Live Without a Net: Regulating Obscenity and Indecency on
the Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDiSC. L.J. 355, 385 (1995) (noting that "[t]he Internet is
unique as a communications entity due to both the size of its audience and the immediacy
of communication between people"). For instance, "[a] full page of English text is about
16,000 bits. A fast modem can move about 57,000 bits in one second." MATISSE ENZER,
GLOSSARY OF INTERNET TERms, at http://www.matisse.net/files/glossary.html (last accessed
Nov. 1, 2004). A Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL"), as commonly configured, "allows
downloads at speeds of up to 1.544 megabits (not megabytes) per second, and uploads at
speeds of 128 kilobits per second." Id.
241. As Michael Froomkin has observed, "Basically, anything you can do with words
and pictures, you can do anonymously on the Internet." A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity
and Its Enmities, J. ONLINE L. (1995), at http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/ol/95_96/
froomkin.html (last accessed Dec. 19, 2004). For an interesting early discussion of anony-
mous online speech, see Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the In-
ternet, 75 OR. L. REv. 117 (1996). The opportunity for anonymity is a product of both the
data and the network. Because Internet communications are digital, "the only identifying
marks they carry are information inserted by the sender, the sender's software, or by any
intermediaries who may have relayed the message while it was in transit." See Froomkin,
supra, at 415. In its current incarnation, identification by the decentralized network that
carries (or "relays") your message can be largely avoided. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE 26-28, 217 (Basic Books 1999). Thus, anonymous online
speech and interaction remains a viable option, made available by the network architec-
ture, technologies of anonymity, and user choice. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra; see alsoJoel R.
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76
TEX. L. REv. 553, 574-75 (1998); Mathius Strasser, Beyond Napster: How the Law Might Re-
spond to a Changing Internet Architecture, 28 N. Ky. L. REv. 660, 707-08 (2001) (describing
peer-to-peer architecture, Freenet, and anonymous nodes). For a discussion of the benefits
of online anonymous speech, see Tien, supra.
242. The scope of the Internet, as I use it here, refers both to raw distribution and to
the vast, almost borderless nature of the network. It has been said that the Internet does
not respect national borders, or county, city, town, or village borders for that matter. Thus,
Internet speech is available-whether by choice, lack of control, or unsolicited delivery-
to a multitude of communities, cultures, customs, sensibilities, businesses, and laws. See
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (quoting lower court finding number 86). This
alters both the nature of online communication and its impact. It should be remembered,
of course, that this too is a choice, architected by network design principles. See LESSIG,
supra note 241, at 217. Lessig states:
Cyberspace ... has different architectures .... An extraordinary amount of con-
trol can be built into the environment that people know there. What data can be
collected, what anonymity is possible, what access is granted, what speech will be
heard-all these are choices, not "facts." All these are designed, not found.
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such as the World Wide Web,2 4 4  bulletin boards,245 USENET
groups,2 46 web logs ("blogs"), 247 email,2 48 etc.-incorporates these
characteristics in different measure.
Id.; see also Joseph Kahn, China Has World's Tightest Internet Censorship, Report Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at A13. Kahn reports that that China was able to "block[ ] up to 50,000
sites at some point in the six-month period" because the Internet, unlike telephones for
instance,
has common checkpoints. All traffic passes through routers that make up the
telecommunications backbone here. China blocks all access to many sites, and it
has begun selectively filtering content in real time-even as viewers seek access to
it-and deleting individual links or Web pages that it finds offensive.
Id.
243. Permanency is a simple concept, but its importance is often overlooked in the
context of networked data; with countless computers constantly caching Internet content,
data seldom, if ever, disappears. Indeed, it is rather easy to view the Internet as always "on"
with data permanently stored on millions of servers and instantly available day or night.
244. According to Matisse Enzer,
"World Wide Web" (or simply "the Web" for short) is a term frequently used
(incorrectly) when referring to "The Internet" [;] WWW has two major meanings:
First, loosely used: the whole constellation of resources that can be accessed using
Gopher, FTP, http, telnet, USENET, WAIS, and some other tools.
Second, the universe of hypertext servers (http servers), more commonly called
"web servers", which are the servers that serve web pages to web browsers.
MATISSE ENZER, supra note 240.
245. A Bulletin Board System is described as a
computerized meeting and announcement system that allows people to carry on
discussions, upload and download files, and make announcements without the
people being connected to the computer at the same time. In the early 1990's
there were many thousands (millions?) of BBS's around the world, most are very
small, running on a single IBM clone PC with 1 or 2 phone lines. Some are very
large and the line between a BBS and a system like AOL gets crossed at some
point, but it is not clearly drawn.
Id. Today, "in the United States alone, there are tens of thousands of BBSs." WEBOPEDIA,
BULLETIN BoARD SYSTEM, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/b/bulletinboardsystem
_BBS.html (last accessed Feb. 15, 2005).
246. USENET is "[a] worldwide bulletin board system that can be accessed through the
Internet or through many online services. The USENET contains more than 14,000 fo-
rums, called newsgroups, that cover every imaginable interest group. It is used daily by mil-
lions of people around the world." WEBOPEDIA, USENET, at http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/U/USENET.html (last accessed Feb. 15, 2005).
247. As defined:
A blog is basically ajournal that is available on the web. The activity of updating a
blog is "blogging" and someone who keeps a blog is a "blogger." Blogs are typi-
cally updated daily using software that allows people with little or no technical
background to update and maintain the blog. Postings on a blog are almost al-
ways arranged in chronological order with the most recent additions featured
most prominently.
MATISSF ENZER, supra note 240.
248. Email is described as "[in] essages, usually text, sent from one person to another
via computer. E-mail can also be sent automatically to a large number of addresses." Id.
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It is these unique features of Internet connectivity and communi-
cation, be they structural or relational, that effectively eliminate cer-
tain real-world limitations within the medium. Printed books on
bomb-making may reach thousands of people, but their reach is
sharply limited by issues of access and incentives including availability,
distribution, cost, return, and others. Online bomb-making instruc-
tions carry no such limitations. There is little or no cost to create the
work, to make it available, or to copy and distribute it free-of-charge to
millions of people, all while retaining your own copy. Access is imme-
diate, simultaneous, and anonymous. Those receiving the bomb-mak-
ing instructions, moreover, may likewise make them available to
millions others under the same conditions.
Applied to the likelihood of harm, this absence of limitations is
striking. After all, the question is whether the speech at issue is likely
to produce lawless action.249 Apart from the nature of the speech it-
self, specifically instructing the means of committing a criminal act,
and excluding the imminence requirement, this becomes essentially
an issue of numbers and probability. Billions of people can access the
Internet, millions upon millions of those within the United States. For
the most part, everyone who can access the Internet can access your
website, and therefore if your website contains bomb-making instruc-
tions, those instructions are available to everyone at once with few lim-
itations. Thus, for certain speech, the likelihood analysis is subsumed
by the network.
The question of intent presents a similar problem. If we accept
the DOJ formulation, there are at least two acceptable tests of intent:
First, the knowledge that a particular recipient of the information in-
tends to make improper use of the material; and second, the specific
purpose of facilitating criminal conduct by unknown persons. Under
either standard, there is a significant risk that the nature of the infor-
mation will be leveraged against the nature of the network, such that
intent will be lost as a limiting principle. Why make bomb-making in-
structions available if you do not intend their use? And if you make
those instructions available to millions of people without limitation,
knowing that some will use them for illegal purposes, must you not
intend their use for those purposes? Is this legally suspect? Perhaps.
But, as a matter of evidence, it is strongly persuasive.
And what about Sherman Austin? He knew that his website was
visited by fellow Anarchists, many of whom he knew personally. Austin
249. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
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knew that some of these readers clashed with police before and would
likely do so again at upcoming protests against the International Mon-
etary Fund and World Bank. Austin suggested that the weapons for
which he provided instructions might be used in those protests, to
thwart police action, free fellow protesters from arrest, and destroy
police property. There was no evidence, however, that Austin distrib-
uted his information on a targeted basis via email, directed bulletin
board postings, or USENET groups. Rather, he posted it on a website
for anyone to proactively access. Might this scenario satisfy the intent
requirement?
Adopting the DOJ formulation, it appears so. Austin's words
might certainly be interpreted as encouraging fellow anarchists to util-
ize the instructions he provides to create weapons (including explo-
sive devices) to be used against police officers during two particular
upcoming protests. Assuming that Austin was aware that particular in-
dividuals-fellow Anarchists-visited, read, and utilized his website,
that evidence might support a finding that Austin knew that a particu-
lar recipient of the information intended to make improper use of it.
Even without such knowledge, however, this reading of the facts
would seem to provide adequate evidence of Austin's "specific pur-
pose" to facilitate criminal conduct by a class of persons, even if indi-
vidually unidentified.
The second phenomena to be considered, in addition to struc-
tural friction, is the emergence of isolated virtual communities. A full
discussion of the effect of the Internet on existing communities, as
well as its potential to facilitate new conceptions of community, is well
beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, a few words are of assis-
tance to our analysis.
It is important to remember that the Internet is, at its core, simply
a network for the transmission of data. That data, or content, takes
many forms, each of which incorporates, to varying degrees, interac-
tivity, immediacy, anonymity, permanency, and access restrictions.
There is a tendency, however, even among those versed in the tech-
nology, to focus sociologically on the World Wide Webcast as a hyper-
linked buffet of diverse information. 250 This is the "mass" in mass
250. See, e.g., DAVID WFEINBERGER, SMALL PIECES, LOOSELY JOINED: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
THE WEB (Perseus 2002). Weingberger explains:
[T]here is more and more to distract us-more sites to visit, more arguments to
jump into, more dirty pictures to download, more pure wastes of time. The fact
that the Web is distracting is not an accident. It is the Web's hyperlinked nature
to pull our attention here and there. But it is not clear that this represents a
weakening of our culture's intellectual powers, a lack of focus .... Maybe set free
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media, the vision towards which corporate content, service, and
bandwidth providers will necessarily gravitate. Yet, this perception
only scratches the surface. Other end-user data platforms, such as
email, bulletin boards, and USENET groups, hold the potential for
deepening one's online relationships, providing a more focused,
tightly-knit space for communication. Here is where we find
insularity.251
Internet technology, although potentially a powerful tool of en-
lightenment, also provides the means of limiting one's experiences,
filtering out the objectionable and permitting only the agreeable. Be-
yond the dictates of physical proximity-a real world "friction" that
limits your ability to structure your interactions-lie the tools to de-
fine, search for, and discover your own community, not targeted at
you, but by you. 25 2 At this point, the same technology that opened the
in a field of abundance, our hunger moves us from three meals a day to day-long
grazing.... Perhaps the Web isn't shortening our attention span. Perhaps the
world is just getting more interesting.
Id. at 69.
251. In his recent book, Republic.com, Professor Cass Sunstein expresses growing con-
cern that the Internet, far from expanding one's exposure to diverse realities, instead con-
tributes to fragmentation and isolation. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLICCOM (Princeton 2001)
(expressing a concern that that such isolation-the ability to pre-select the information
and experiences to which you are exposed, and filter out the undesirable-will undermine
the common experiences upon which democratic values and systems thrive). The result:
Insular "'echo chambers' of our own opinions, magnifying and confirming our inclina-
tions and resulting in a deeply polarized society." Anupam Chander, Whose Republic?, 69 U.
CH. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2002) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001)). Sun-
stein's vision, although embraced by some, has generally been rejected as failing to recog-
nize the Internet's scope of access and capacity for discovery. See generally James Fallows,
He's Got Mail, N. Y. REv. BooKs, Mar. 14, 2002, at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15180
(collecting and discussing various critical reviews of Republic.com) (last accessed Nov. 1,
2004). In the face of such criticism, Sunstein was moved to publish a response in which he
appeared to recast, and perhaps reject, his original argument. Restating his contention-
"The Internet is bad for democracy, because it is reducing common experiences and pro-
ducing a situation in which people live in echo chambers of their own design" -Sunstein
then went on to reject it outright: "I do not endorse [this] claim. I believe that [it) is
basically wrong, because the Internet is allowing millions of people to expand their hori-
zons and to encounter new worlds of topics and ideas." Id. (quoting Sunstein's response to
the BOSTON REVIEW). Thus, what might have embodied a bold statement about the nature
of Internet "community," appears abandoned.
252. Try this experiment. Assume that you are angry about globalization-it is draining
jobs from the United States, exploiting workers in foreign countries, and ruining the envi-
ronment. Through mainstream network news, you hear that negotiations towards an agree-
ment creating a free-trade zone across the Americas ("Free Trade Area of the Americas" or
"FTAA") are entering their final phase. You want more information, so you go to
www.google.com and search for "FTAA." The first entry in your search results is a web page
headlined "Stop the FTAA!" That hyperlink leads you to a web page providing information
on HIAA opposition and plans to demonstrate at the latest round of negotiations in
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world can just as quickly close it. Certain end-user platforms are inten-
tionally structured to facilitate limitation. The fact that a particular
group of individuals uses a global network to trade data packets does
not necessarily create openness. Indeed, it is the ability to tag that
data, define its content, and structure its dissemination that creates
isolation. A single anarchist may at first employ Internet technology as
a tool of exploration, through which he discovers other Anarchists
from around the country who share his views-they connect, they
bond, they create community. As these relationships deepen, how-
ever, that same Internet technology becomes a tool of exclusion, lend-
ing an ability to self-define to the tendency to do so-they retreat,
they support, they incite, they embolden. They act?
Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that the Internet
facilitates the creation of smaller communities comprised of individu-
als who are isolated from society at large because of a particular trait
and from one another by physical space and difficulties of recogni-
tion. Specifically, the Internet provides the means of connecting indi-
viduals with concealed, 253 marginalized identities (ideological, sexual,
Miami. See STOP THE FTAA at http://www.stopftaa.org (last accessed Feb. 10, 2005). It also
invites you to "Plug into the indymedia matrix for FTAA Miami! ... a collective of indepen-
dent media organizations and thousands of journalists offering grassroots, non-corporate
coverage," by clicking on another hyperlink. Id. This leads you to the Independent Media
Center's (Indymedia) FTAA website, see http://www.ftaaimc.org/en/index.shtml (last ac-
cessed Nov. 1 2004), and then, via hyperlink, to the Indymedia home page, see http://
www.indymedia.org. You live in a small town outside of Los Angeles, so you click on the
hyperlink to Los Angeles Independent Media. See http://la.indymedia.org (last accessed
Nov. 1, 2004). On the left-hand side of the web page is a hyperlink to "Raise the Fist." Id.
This leads you to a series of stories about Sherman Austin, see http://la.indymedia.org/
features/RaiseTheFist (last accessed Nov. 1, 2004), and eventually his website and (for-
merly) bomb-making information, see http://www.raisethefist.com/indexl.html (last ac-
cessed Nov. 1, 2004). Thus far yourjourney might be characterized as one of discovery and
exposure, but is that a realistic stopping point? Intrigued by Austin's information on an-
archism, you return to www.google.com to search for more information on "anarchy." The
Google "Groups" section lists five anarchist message boards. The "Web" search returns
links to multiple anarchist organizations and individuals. The "Directory" section does the
same. You discover an entire community that shares your view of globalization. Do you ever
go back to www.google.com, re-run your search for the "FTAA," and click on that second
search result-the official website of the FTAA? See http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca-e.asp
(last accessed Nov. 1, 2004). Instead, bulletin boards lead to USENET groups, which lead
to email; the circle becomes tighter.
253. For a comparison to conspicuously marginalized individuals, see, e.g., obesity, race,
or visible handicap. See Katelyn Y. A. McKenna &John A. Bargh, Coming Out in the Age of the
Internet: Identity "Demarginalization" Through Virtual Group Participation, 75 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PsYcH. 681 (1998).
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and the like), promoting approval of these identities and self-esteem
grounded in social acceptance. 254 Indeed,
the emergence of virtual groups and internet newsgroups enable
this group of concealed marginalized persons to connect with their
similar others, resulting in identity demarginalizaion-a process
by which participation in a group of similar others creates positive
changes in one's identity, where there was formerly only isolation
and feelings of being different.255
Such approval, not only of self, but of ideas, beliefs, and practices
that might be characterized as socially unacceptable, creates a percep-
tion of danger-small groups of like-minded individuals supporting
one another in deviant behavior.
The effect of this phenomena on the specifics of our analysis is
admittedly difficult to quantify, but nonetheless real. It plays into our
fears and preconceptions. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold were social
outcasts. They found solace and support in an online community of
likewise disaffected individuals, connected to people and information
otherwise inaccessible. They found bomb-making materials and used
them to kill their classmates. Most of their online activities were practi-
cally untraceable. Foreign terrorists find support, both material and
spiritual, in online communities. Websites extol their "sacrifice" and
encourage others. Instant messaging provides untraceable communi-
cation. Detailed blueprints of United States landmarks are sent by
email, along with instructions on how to make the bomb to destroy
them. These are the stories that the media tells us.
These insular communities, and the perceptions they engender,
are potentially powerful influences on the instructional speech analy-
sis. As regards consideration of the dominant factors of that analysis,
likelihood of harm and intent, this might be seen as the flip-side of
254. Id.
255. See id. The authors state:
Internet newsgroups allow individuals to interact with others in a relatively anony-
mous fashion and thereby provide individuals with concealable stigmatized identi-
ties a place to belong not otherwise available. Thus, membership in these groups
should become an important part of identity. Study 1 found that members of
newsgroups dealing with marginalized-concealable identities modified their new-
sgroup behavior on the basis of reactions of other members, unlike members of
marginalized-conspicuous or mainstream newsgroups. This increase in identity
importance from newsgroup participation was shown in both Study 2 (marginal-
ized sexual identities) and Report 3 (marginalized ideological identities) to lead
to greater self-acceptance, as well as coming out about the secret identity to family
and friends. Results supported the view that Internet groups obey general princi-
ples of social group functioning and have real-life consequences for the
individual.
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the "scope" argument discussed above. There, likelihood becomes an
issue of raw probability based on the breadth of exposure, while evi-
dence of intent is derived from one's willingness to provide "danger-
ous" information to a massive, undifferentiated audience (some
portion of who undoubtedly harbor malicious purposes). In the con-
text of isolated virtual communities, however, it is the opposite-
namely the limited and insular nature of the group-that creates evi-
dence of both likelihood of harm and intent. Most importantly, the
individual providing the bomb-making instructions often knows im-
portant facts about those receiving the information, their political be-
liefs, past actions, intentions, and the like. The provider may also
know that the community itself will support and encourage the use of
those instructions in the commission of criminal acts. Why make
bomb-making instructions available to individuals that you know to be
inclined to use them? Why participate in a community that supports
such a use? As a practical matter, these rhetorical questions can cer-
tainly by persuasive.
Conclusion
In their famous dissents from Abrams and Gitlow, Justices Holmes
and Brandeis repudiate the "bad tendency" test set forth in Schenck.
That test allowed the proscription of speech that has the natural ten-
dency and probable effect of bringing about a substantive evil that the
government has the right to prevent. In Dennis, that test was cleverly
described, all claims to the contrary, such that tendency became a
measure of the speech itself and probability became a question of
numbers. The more grave the harm, the fewer adherents required.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis understood the potential injury that this
formulation posed to First Amendment rights. The very speech most
worthy of protection-dissident speech, political expression, demo-
cratic discourse-if spoken at a time of perceived vulnerability, might
well be characterized as the most dangerous to the republic. That
characterization, defined by legislative fiat, could control the constitu-
tional analysis.
As we wait for the Supreme Court to address the constitutional
treatment of instructional speech, we sit on the precipice of a return,
perhaps unintentional, to the "bad tendency" test. For speech that
specifically instructs a sufficiently harmful act, abstract dangerousness
is presumed, limited only by the likelihood of the resulting action and
divorced from temporal connection. The gravity of the evil to be pre-
vented remains a commanding measure of danger. The likelihood of
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such harm, freed from imminence, becomes a question of context.
That context is skewed by the very nature of the Internet, such that an
analysis of the likelihood of the harm becomes conclusory. The fac-
tual question of intent is overwhelmed by the convergence of these
considerations. Speech becomes regulated as speech alone-just as
Justices Holmes and Brandeis feared.
In Whitney v. California,256 Justice Brandeis warned that context
remained the essential touchstone for the judicial restraint of govern-
ment censorship:
[A] legislative declaration [of public danger] ... does not preclude
enquiry into the question whether, at the time and under the cir-
cumstances, the conditions existed which are essential to validity
under the Federal Constitution .... Whenever the fundamental
rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have been in-
vaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue
whether... the danger, if any, was imminent; and whether the evil
apprehended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent re-
striction interposed by the legislature. The legislative declaration,
like the fact that the statute was passed and was sustained by the
highest court of the State, creates merely a rebuttable presumption
that these conditions have been satisfied.257
But in the scenario I have described, with the requirement of im-
minence elided and the questions of contextual dangerousness, likeli-
hood of harm, and intent subsumed in the very nature of the
frictionless network, the legislative dictate of dangerousness emerges
as authoritative. Restrictions on online speech become nearly self-
validating.
It is precisely this sort of reactionary outcome-justified on the
basis of perceived threats to traditional power structures-that led Jus-
tices Holmes, Brandeis, and others to repudiate and reform the public
danger doctrine. In crafting an analysis that incorporates contextual
factors, Brandenburg and its progeny preserve a judicial check on gov-
ernment repression of dissident speech. With those contextual factors
effectively purged from the analysis, however, government is left to
define a "public danger" as most advantageous to its maintenance of
authority. The likelihood of such an outcome, particularly in the con-
text of online speech, is deeply troubling. For many of us, the beauty
of open Internet architecture is most profoundly realized in free ex-
pression. It would be anathema to use the very core of that ideal as the
foundation for analytical validation of greater governmental control.
256. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
257. Id. at 378-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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